Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-217 *9 November 1995*

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Commentary Views Prospects for Dayton Talks

LD0911000795 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 8 Nov 95

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic in Bonn]

[FBIS Translated Text] What can we expect from the resumption of talks in Dayton, when the agreements reached there cannot even be implemented in Erdut? Let us go back—the Americans advertised the statement on the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations as the first big negotiating success. It turned out, however, to be the first big failure because the Serbs had once again revealed two faces—one on the U.S. air base and another in Erdut. This brings us to the question of whether other agreements, should they be reached, will suffer the same fate, especially because the atmosphere in Dayton is heavy and tense, even depressing, as one of the Western papers described it.

Milosevic feels cheated because he thinks that too much is being asked of him. Izetbegovic is not giving up more Bosnian territory than the Muslims can realistically have [as heard]. The Croatian president, on the other side, has no intentions whatsoever of yielding to any of the demands linked to the remaining occupied territories.

Does this mean that the Dayton talks have already run aground? I believe that everything now depends on the next U.S. diplomatic strategy. If they fail to understand, among other things, that the speedy and total reintegration of Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srjem is not a Croatian national whim but one of the premises behind a compromise solution in Bosnia, the chances of salvaging the agreement are very small. Not only because, objectively speaking, there could have been no Dayton talks without Croatia's military successes, but also because Croatia today carries such military and political weight in Bosnia that there could be no permanent balance of interests between the Serbs and the Muslims without it. In other words, peace in this region, ladies and gentlemen in Dayton, can today only be possible with Croatia, and never against its vital interests.

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Report Accuses Greece of 'Mass Deportations'

AU0811184995 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 7 Nov 95 p 19

[Report by Gezim Toto: "Mass Deportations of Emigrants From Greece Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday 506 emigrants were deported from our customs points—180 at the Kapshtice border point and 326 in Kakavije. Of the 506 deportees, 505 were alive and one was dead. The deceased emigrant was 36-year-old Nikoll Zeka from Puke. Even though Greece has deported 1 million Albanians within the past four years, it still continues to experiment with Albanian emigrants. A total of 2,000 emigrants were deported this week, including those who were deported yesterday. Thus, while the so-called legalization of Albanians working in Greece is being spoken about and highly propagated, the Greek Government is not only not implementing this legalization, but is also discriminating against Albanians at their work places, with their salaries, and in the way they are being detained and treated during deportation. Among the 506 deportees, more than 15 were mistreated by the police. This deportation, which keeps increasing, was carried out just two days following the Greek Government's pressure to open Greek schools, and after Mr. Stefanopoulos' statement conditioning Berisha's invitation to visit the country with the opening of Greek schools in Albania, giving rise to a clamorous hullabaloo by the Greek and Albanian media. Thus, it can be seen that every condition that Greece tries to impose on us is accompanied by a wave of harassment and deportation of emigrants.

University Survey on Parties Seen Unreliable

AU0511203595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 31 October carries on page 2 a 1,600-word report by E. Brace on the "Philology-Sociology Faculty Survey" on political opinion in Albania, published recently in RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, under the title "Ghost Survey-PD [Democratic Party] Will Not Win."

After describing the results of the recent survey on the political opinion of about 1,020 Albanians in 18 cities and 84 communes in Albania, conducted by the "Faculty of Philology-Sociology," which reveals that "the PD politicans have greater credibility," the article also gives the results of the 26 July 1992 elections, previous Socialist Party [PS] surveys, and the EU Eurobarometer, that prove the contrary. The newspaper continues, "On Sunday [29 October] the results were totally reversed by something done in the name of Tirana University. Not by elections, but by another survey. The one who conducted this survey is Aleksander Kocani." The newspaper says that he is a "lecturer in philosophy, though he graduated in physics," adding that, through the survey, he said "he tried to curb the electoral downfall of the party in power."

The article continues, "Dhori Karaj, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, told ZERI I POPULLIT yesterday that 'there is no Faculty of Philology-Sociology in Tirana University. Our Faculty of Social Sciences has a Sociology-Philosophy Department.' The dean says that he has authorized no group to make a survey and he does not know anything about the published survey. 'The lecturers are free to do whatever they like, I am not responsible for this,' he said." The reporter also asked Artan Fuga, head of the Sociology-Philosophy Department, who "answered ironically that he does not work in the Philology-Sociology Faculty, but in the Sociology-Philosophy Department." Asked about whether he knew anything about the survey conducted by his department, M. Fuga said, "'No official survey has been conducted, but this does not mean that some lecturers cannot make surveys and give those results.' As the heads of the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Philosophy-Sociology Department pointed out, there is nothing official in the survey published on Sunday in the name of Tirana University."

The reporter wanted to interview Aleksander Kocani, but he refused saying, "I will not say anything to ZERI I POPULLIT or KOHA JONE" though he "agreed to having conducted the survey." The report continues, "Kocani was determined not to give any details, though his survey contains strange elements. There are 1,020 people in at least 102 locations (18 towns and 84 communes), something that shows that the number interviewed in each town or commune is very small. Kocani refuses to give even the number surveyed in each town and commune. Nevertheless, he accepts the motive that drove him to conduct the survey: 'Deputy Gramoz Ruci's declaration that there are PD surveys showing that the PS will win 60 percent of the votes.'" The report goes on, "Doubt increases when thinking that, for a week, people in 18 cities and 84 communes were surveyed," adding that "Kocani tried to defend his survey by saying that 'Albania's acceptance in the EU has reversed the 6 November electorate in favor of the PD.' Though the 'surveyer' accepts this, he refuses to show any of the survey sheets to prove this."

The report concludes, "Kocani agreed that there are no survey groups, but it is one group, his group. 'It was I, another lecturer, and four students' he said. Kocani said that not all of them belonged to the Philosophy-Sociology Department but he refused to give their names. 'They are secret. If I reveal their names, you will try to ask them, and they will probably speak out,'

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he said. This is the man who conducted the interview in the name of Tirana University."

Commission To Consider Private Broadcasting Bill

AU0711215795 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 7 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by Ilir Alia: "Private Television Arrives"]

[FBIS-Translated Text] Tirana—The Albanians will soon also be able to watch private television. After a great deal of debate over opening private television and radio stations, the Parliamentary Commission for Culture and the Media will start to discuss today the new bill "On Public and Private Radio and Television Stations." The new bill covers the creation of a special committee; the granting of licenses; what may not be broadcast in programs and advertisements; when licenses may be revoked; the distribution of public, private, national, and local broadcasts; and many other points. There will nevertheless be no more than four television channels, two public and two private, able to broadcast over the whole of Albania. The bill that has now reached parliament is a second version, after another that was put forward for discussion about one year ago failed to win support and was sent back for revision.

What does the bill contain and what does it predict the radio and television will be like? The bill's 135 articles cover everything. From the start, the bill prohibits state interference in the contents of radio and television programs, except in cases provided for by law. A special committee with a chairman, deputy chairman, and five members is to supervise the work of the broadcasting stations. Only the People's Assembly has the right to elect this chairman, following the proposal of two candidates by the president. The bill also provides ways to dismiss the chairman and all the committee members. The committee's tasks include granting and revoking licenses, establishing compulsory guidelines for broadcasts relating to natural disasters and states of emergency, program schedules, and the right of reply. It also lays down regulations for party political broadcasts during election campaigns and referendums.

Who will have the right to found a television or radio station and how fast will he receive a positive or negative answer? It is planned that a tender will be held, whose winners may establish television and radio stations. After sending a submission to the committee, applicants must wait 90 days before receiving approval, and must also fulfill certain other conditions. Those wishing to found a national television station must possess capital of 100 million leks, or 20 million leks for a radio station. Sums of 10 million leks and four million leks are required as guarantees for local television and radio stations.

There are four ways in which licenses can be revoked. In addition, the national committee has the right to license only two public radio and television stations, and the same number of private stations. Both public and private broadcasting stations will also be obliged to transmit free of charge announcements and statements by senior representatives of the state. Advertising and forms of sponsorship occupy a special place in this bill.

Our country has long been subject to an epidemic of private radio stations, even if they are illegal.

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Alleged French Interest in Kozloduy Reactor Metal

AU0811141895 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 6-12 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Neyka Krusteva: "Kozloduy Hides Secrets of Russian Nuclear Submarines"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The French secret services' interest is not directed toward the No. 1 Reactor at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, but toward the Russian nuclear submarines, a well-informed source who wishes to remain anonymous informed 168 CHASA. According to the source, the shells of the nuclear reactors of the submarines are made of the same metal as the reactor at Kozloduy.

Foreign specialists have themselves admitted that the composition and technology of the Russian metal are still unknown to the West. This is the reason that they asked us to cut a 1.5 cm metal strip from the shell of the No. 1 Reactor. Our specialists assert that the specimens of metal shavings that we have offered for testing are quite sufficient to establish the condition of the reactor. However, they were evidently not enough for the purposes of economic espionage, and this is the very reason that the French mounted a furious attack against putting the No. 1 reactor back into operation.

According to energy experts at the Kozloduy Plant, the No. 3 reactor is creating many more problems than the No. 1 unit, and this is no secret to their colleagues in West Europe.

During the ecological conference in Sofia [on 23-25 October], Western ecologists called Kozloduy a second Chernobyl. According to our counterintelligence experts, the guests at the conference included at least a dozen representatives of foreign intelligence services.

According to Bulgarian Security Service officers, it is lucky that the pressure was not applied when another government was in office, such as Filip Dimitrov's administration, for example. According to them, since we gave away our own secrets to foreign intelligence services, including our secret mobilization plans, we could as equally easily have made them a present of the Russians' secrets.

Videnov Accuses Zhelev of Violating Electoral Law

AU0811191995 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Nov 95 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "Zhan Videnov: Head of State Is Violating Electoral Law"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The statement that President Zhelyu Zhelev made on the radio following his lunch with Ms. Reneta Indzhova on 3 November is a gross breach of the Local Elections Act, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov said in answer to a question at a meeting with the electors in Montana on 4 November, DUMA correspondent Tsvetomir Tsvetkov reports. Videnov assured his supporters that the Central Electoral Commission had had its attention drawn to these actions of the president and is due to issue a ruling concerning them. According to the prime minister, Zhelev's public campaigning to persuade people to vote for Stefan Sofiyanski, as the philosopher himself intends to do, has the purpose of gaining popularity with the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] so they propose his candidature for a further term as president. Videnov informed his audience and the radio listeners in Montana that the government will continue to insist that the second Danube bridge be built in western Bulgaria, either between Vidin and Calafat or Lom and Rastu. He urged the people in Montana to vote in the second round of the elections for BSP candidate Penka Yordanova, who culled 45 percent of the votes in the first round. He said that the red mayors will work in unison with the government and will not divert the subsidies granted to them, as Videnov suspects has been done until now. [passage omitted]

BSP Lost 740,000 Votes Since Dec Election

AU0811191695 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Nov 95 p 1

[Report by Ekaterina Nikolova: "BSP Has Lost 750,000 Votes in Nine Months"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—The central election campaign headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] reported yesterday that the BSP had lost 743,000 votes throughout the country, compared to the votes cast at the parliamentary elections in December 1994. A high BSP functionary said that the figures had been supplied by the party's sociologists. Reports about the level of activity shown by the old party members allegedly showed that only 63 percent of the comrades in Sofia who voted for the BSP parliamentary candidates now support the red banker Ventsislav Yosifov.

The local grassroots organizations have sent 20 applications to BSP headquarters for more money to fund the second round of the local elections. The total amount involved is about 1 million leva [Lv]. Informed sources say that the party organizations in Plovdiv District, Svishtov, and Silistra are due to receive Lv50,000 apiece.

The campaign headquarters is reported to have asked Zhan Videnov to tour the large towns to campaign for the Socialist candidates. Last night, the prime minister appeared in Stara Zagora, and he is due to campaign in Kozloduy next week. Yanaki Stoilov has reportedly

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received instructions to help Aleksandur Marinov and Ventsislav Yosifov in Sofia.

Commentary on Restoration of Communist International

AU0811192195 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 Nov 95 p 6

[Commentary by Konstantin Subchev]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Sofia, 17 parties of the Marxist-Leninist-type restored the Communist International that dissolved itself (or more precisely, was dissolved by Stalin) in 1943.

It is extremely dubious to what extent a doctrine, which proved its bankruptcy and is unacceptable because of its total disregard for the individual, can rise again, in Europe, not to mention the fact that the calls for the use of violent methods to regain power contravene Article 11, Paragraph 4, of the Bulgarian Constitution, at the very least. However, as long as the world contains people who are oppressed, suffering, or simply misused by life itself, the belief in life after death or in communist utopias will continue to exist.

However, the transformation of the Bulgarian capital into the capital of the world's proletariat also has aspects that relate to domestic politics. The results achieved by the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] last December [in the parliamentary elections] and in the local elections at present should not be underestimated, and if things in Bulgaria do not take a turn for the better, Vladimir Spasov's supporters may well surmount the 4-percent hurdle in the elections to the 38th National Assembly.

In any case, this development provides much food for thought at the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] headquarters. Stefan Prodev [DUMA chief editor] may well be right in saying that the BSP must determine whether it is a "party of the red old ladies" or a "party of the mobile telephones," and then each should join his or her own party.

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Havel Admits to Differences With Klaus

AU0811212795 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "(li)": "Havel Said That He Differs With Klaus in His Views on the Division of State Authority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Although President Vaclav Havel emphasized that he shares the same views as Prime Minister Klaus on the basic ideas for the Republic, he declared that, at the same time, the two of them differ, for example, in their views on decentralizing the state.

"The prime minister probably does not consider decentralizing the state to be as important as I do; he does not consider the creation of a nonprofit sector to be as important as I do. We accentuate various aspects of an issue even in certain foreign policy matters," said the president in an interview for Radio Frekvence 1.

The dispute over dividing state authority has been manifested, for example, by the president's insistence over several years that the country be divided into regions and that authority be transferred from above, while the prime minister repeats that this issue is not very topical.

"It seems to me that two people who have their own views of the world and their own identities cannot always agree on everything—likewise if each has a different personality," said the president with regard to the differences between him and the prime minister.

Havel said that he consults the prime minister on foreign policy matters only exceptionally because his office is in constant touch with the Foreign Ministry.

Dlouhy Sees Recovery in ODA-ODS Relations

AU0811144895 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Nov 95 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Dlouhy, trade and industry minister and ODA deputy chairman, by Miroslav Korecky; place and date not given: "Things Have Been Cleared Up Between ODA and the ODS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Korecky] Is the most popular politician not concerned that the old adage "Out of sight, out of mind" will be applied to him?

[Dlouhy] It is unfortunate that I have contracted such a long-term illness at this time. I am not concerned about this, but I am trying to press on with my normal work at the ministry and with my political work in the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]. We simply have to overcome this together.

[Korecky] Your illness prevented you from taking part in the ODA nationwide conference in Ostrava at which Chairman Jan Kalvoda made a rather critical speech targeted at the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. Were you prepared to take the edge off this blade?

[Dlouhy] The conference in Ostrava presented ODA as a party that, although it has gone through a certain crisis, is going into the parliamentary elections with a clear political program. It is logical for the party chairman to make a comprehensive speech on this occasion. I had prepared a speech that was more concerned with the specific measures contained in the election program. ODA must now not only bring attention to the promises that have not been kept, but also suggest concrete solutions to individual problems. It is necessary to preannounce the continuation of this coalition after the elections, but, at the same time, ODA wants to compete constructively with the other coalition parties.

[Korecky] Has the Ostrava conference not tarnished the overall relationship between your party and the ODS?

[Dlouhy] Although it seems paradoxical, I think that relations between ODA and the ODS have improved and are better defined after the conference than they were before it. It was stated clearly where ODA sees the next steps in the continuing transformation of our economy and society as a whole, steps that differ in some things from ODS policy, which certainly does not mean that cooperation will be impossible. Of course, there still may be minor exchanges of fire within the coalition before the elections, but I do not think they will have a fundamental influence on anything. I am convinced that it will become apparent that the ODS and ODA provide a sound basis for a new coalition after next year's elections.

Antimerger Group in KDS Establishes Platform

AU0811191895 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "(gro)": "The KDS Members Who Reject Its Merger With the ODS Have Established a Platform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The members of the Christian Democratic Party [KDS] who reject the merger with the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] founded a platform "For the Preservation of the KDS" on 4 November. Its spokesman Rostislav Gargulak said that representatives from seven of the 11 regions where the KDS operates attended the constituent meeting. Gargulak considers the newly established platform to be a declaration of disagreement with the KDS's merger with the ODS.

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According to Gargulak, the majority of KDS members do not agree with the merger. "This is equivalent to some 30-40 of the delegates who will vote on the merger at the congress," said Gargulak. "It really is an absurd situation. We want to preserve the party, and the leadership wants to break it up at any cost."

Gargulak revealed that KDS Deputy Chairman Vaclav Benda had said with regard to the establishment of the platform that its plausible victory within the party would be a catastrophe. "The general public is aware of the motives for Dr. Benda's political involvement, and it is obvious what he means by the word 'catastrophe,'" said Gargulak in response to Benda's statement. He is convinced that the KDS can play an important role on the Czech political scene and that there is no reason for its breakup.

Tamara Inventor: Radar 'Easily,' 'Cheaply' Jammed

AU0811192295 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta and Jan Gazdik: "I Will Take the Device for Silencing Tamara to the Grave, Says the Radar's Inventor"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brno—The man in whose mind Tamara, one of the most perfect and, at the same time, feared espionage radar systems of the Cold War, has hatched claims that the system can be jammed very easily and cheaply.

"It is an ingenious and incredibly simple solution," says its inventor, Vlastimil Pech. He is refusing to say anything more about the device, however, whose cost he estimates at roughly one-fiftieth of the cost of the famous espionage system. "I will take the device for silencing my child to the grave," he adds.

He thinks that no one else will manage to discover the secret of how to effectively and cheaply jam his radar. [passage omitted]

Poll: Decline in Trust in Institutions Halted

AU0811075695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 1 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by "(jik)": "The Slump in Confidence in the Institutions Has Been Halted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The vacation-period slump in the public's confidence in the constitutional institutions—the government, parliament, and the president—has evidently come to a halt.

The Institute for Public Opinion Research yesterday announced the results of its most recent poll, which was conducted at the end of September and the beginning of October. It is apparent from it that the president, government, and Chamber of Deputies now enjoy slightly more support than in past months. President Vaclav Havel is trustworthy for 73 percent of citizens, the government for 56 percent, and the legislature for 27 percent. This is an increase of roughly 3.0 percent for all three of them, compared with the previous month.

Jiri Cesal of the Institute pointed out, however, that no change was recorded for any constitutional institution that would exceed the bounds of random statistical error. Despite this, the poll has demonstrated unequivocally that the percentage of social democratic voters who trust President Havel has gone up considerably compared with September. While at the end of the summer vacation there were only 59 percent of them among Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] voters, there were 11 percent more at the beginning of October. Some sociologists had attributed the considerable decline in confidence in the president last month among the supporters of the strongest opposition party to the overall decline in his popularity. The government's appeal among CSSD voters in October went up from 30 percent to 39 percent and that of parliament from 9.0 percent to 17 percent.

The Institute has ascertained that young people under age 30—students, people with a tertiary education, businessmen, and Civic Democratic Party voters—maintain above-average confidence in the president, government, and parliament. Ninety-one percent of the strongest coalition party's voters trust the president, 88 percent trust the government, and 42 percent trust parliament.

Corruption in Trade Unions Viewed

95CH0346A Prague TYDEN in Czech 7 Aug 95 pp 30-31

[Commentary and interview with Eugen Skultety, deputy chairman of the KOVO Trade Union Association, by Milan Zitny in Bratislava; place and date of interview not given: "Disorder and Corruption in the Trade Unions?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Commentary]

Slovak trade unions are currently living through a situation that is already well known to the political parties, which, at one time, formed an alliance with the chairman of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar: They are threatened with disintegration. The Confederation of Trade Union Associations (KOS) now has no time to

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deal with the government or the employers because it has to struggle with itself.

* * *

When, in mid-July, five top representatives of the principal trade union associations resigned from the KOS Board of Directors in protest against inaction by central authorities on tripartite matters and when they invited other members to follow them, no one expected this development. It was nevertheless preceded by coarse steps taken by the government: Employee commuter discounts were eliminated, telephone rates were increased, and a 10-percent increase in the price of energy is being planned. According to the KOVO Trade Union Association, which stands at the head of the "rebellion," many people can no longer tolerate such a burden. After all, in heavy industry, with the exception of metallurgy, the average monthly wage amounts to 6,500 korunas [Kc].

Through a set of amendments to the economic laws, the government has done away with coupon privatization, restricted the activities of the capital market, and introduced the principle of golden shares in so-called strategic enterprises. The founders of these enterprises will now be the ministries—much the same as under communism. For trade unionists from the KOVO enterprise, the Ministry of Economics once more becomes the employer, the social partner, just as was the case prior to November 1989. Although the government approved the promised principles underlying employee corporations, it transferred the implementation of authorities in the given area to the National Property Fund (FNM). This fund is no partner to the trade unions in the tripartite arrangements, and so the Confederation of Trade Union Associations again came up empty-handed.

Prime Minister Meciar knows how to handle his social partners. As of January 1993 through this day, he has managed to hold the trade unions and their leaders on a short rein of promises he has failed to keep. In places where the trade unions would have been able to threaten the use of the whip, a sugar coating was put in place in the form of a share in large business undertakings.

Eugen Skultety, deputy chairman of the KOVO Trade Union Association, says that he does not want to accuse anybody of corruption, but... At the East Slovakia Steel Mills, the largest holding corporation of its type in Slovakia, industrial lobbies, closely related to the HZDS and the FNM, found a recipe for avoiding possible pressure by trade unionists from the KOVO Trade Union Association. In February, the FNM transferred one-tenth of the securities of the VSZ [East Slovakia Steel Mills] through direct sale, and deeply below the market price, to the Hutnik Corporation of Kosice. The founder of Hutnik is the general counsel of trade unions at the VSZ. Trade union members-employees became employers overnight and soon indicated whose interests they intend to pursue. The criticism of the leaders of the KOVO Trade Union Association for their consequential attitudes toward the government surfaced recently—specifically from the bowels of the VSZ trade union organization.

Trade unionists can also be corrupted in other ways; for example, by being granted membership in oversight councils, where they draw a substantial remuneration. "It has been difficult for them to defend the interests of the trade unions," say the leaders of the KOVO group. It is their experience that even in Germany representatives of the IG Metall Corporation will sit on oversight councils of the enterprise. But they pass on their remuneration directly for charitable purposes.

After the resignation of five individuals from the leadership of the KOS, Alojz Englis, president of the confederation, began to organize meetings all over Slovakia in order to "save" what could still be saved. However, according to some trade unionists, he is saving only his own position. Pressure from the trade union associations, which are, in turn, being pressed by their memberships, is a threat to all leaders without regard to their positions, and this brings about their increased activity. Englis rejected the challenge by the KOVO Trade Union Association to resign from his job. His vice president, Vaclav Stefko, claims that not even abdication can resolve the delicate situation. Paid officials are relying on the fact that the confederation is made up of approximately 42 trade union associations, and, according to the statutes, each has a representative in the leadership without regard to the number of members being represented. Jozef Krumpolec, chairman of the KOVO Trade Union Association, who is one of those who resigned from the leadership of the KOS, denies the intention to destroy the trade unions: "At the next congress of the confederation, we shall propose a change in the statutes: large associations would then have greater representation than the small ones. The congress must be convened as soon as possible. Until that time, we shall be organizing protest actions."

The toughest course was embarked upon by the trade union organization of miners, geologists, and petroleum workers. If the government does not stop additional social restrictions, then they will demand that wages be increased radically. Marian Mesiarik, chairman of the association, threatens: "We have reached the limits of social tolerance. If the government and the employers do not begin to solve our demands rapidly, then we shall go at things the hard way. You do not want to see the ensuing superinflation!"

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The trade unionists are planning massive public actions in September. For the present, they are refusing to resort to strikes as an extreme means. Responding to the question as to how the trade unions will conduct themselves in the event that the government and the employers fail to heed their demands, Jozef Krumpolec responds: "The best strike is the one that does not take place. We will not now reveal the secrets of our strategy. Our colleagues in the Czech Republic only threatened to strike recently—and gained nothing."

[Interview]

Eugen Skultety, deputy chairman of the powerful KOVO Trade Union Association, responds to questions by TYDEN.

[Zitny] The deputy chairman of the KOVO Trade Union Association, together with his colleagues in the mining industry, transportation, and others, has given up representing his trade union in the leadership of the Confederation of Trade Union Associations. What led these people to take this step?

[Skultety] Pressure from the membership. It will be useful for us to construct a trade union central in the future that will take into account the strong trade union associations. If the power company workers decide on a radical solution, then they will prove able to block life throughout the Republic. We, on the other hand, even if we have 100,000 members and are numerically the strongest association, are not dangerous. If we stop work for a day or two in a few factories, we pose no threat to anyone. But not everyone has left the KOS. A million and a half members of the confederation are organized in 42 associations. Agreement is hardly possible. Moreover, trade unions in the banking industry, insurance industry, or cultural areas have completely different interests from us.

[Zitny] How do you regard the entrepreneurial activities of trade unionists at the East Slovakia Steel Mills, who own the Hutnik Corporation?

[Skultety] We should welcome the fact that trade unionists have acquired this property under advantageous conditions. The packet of VSZ securities, valued at Kc1.6 billion, was acquired by them for Kc600 million. But what is left for paying for development programs? The minister of finance claims that whatever the National Property Fund takes in will be sufficient. Okay, but it is difficult to want money in one breath in order to finance promising programs and to demand, in the same breath, that the enterprise be given to our people at no charge! This is schizophrenic.

[Zitny] On the one hand, a number of leaders are privatizing; on the other hand, trade union members are reaching the limits of social carrying capacity, so to speak. What is the problem?

[Skultety] In this country, the idea has asserted itself that, in the event of employee stock corporations, management should have the controlling packet of securities. But who is to guarantee that this, allegedly tested, management will actually be efficient? Employees could, theoretically, even buy 90 percent of the securities and could actually pay for skilled management. We brought to the attention of our membership as well as to the Ministry of Economics that breaking up the securities according to the proposal made by the officials is not at all advantageous to employees. It simply does not give them any influence.

[Zitny] How do you plan to resolve the current crisis?

[Skultety] We shall initiate protest actions at the latest in September. But this will not be a matter of sterile meetings, as was the case in the past. In the event the confederation cannot organize them at the necessary level, we, together with other trade unions, will create an action-capable organizational committee.

[Zitny] In other words, the disintegration of the confederation and a strike?

[Skultety] According to our standards, it is not possible for the time being to speak of a strike. Such an action could be directed only against an employer or could be proclaimed in conjunction with the conclusion of a collective agreement. But not under pressure of asserting the implementation of obligations based on this agreement—something we are marking up in the legislative process. The employers are making out as though this had nothing to do with them.

[Zitny] Do you see fundamental differences in the activities of the trade unions in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia?

[Skultety] We have not been broken up so long that we do not know any essential information applicable to each other. We have good partnership relationships with the Czech KOVO Trade Union Association. Their prime minister is no more acceptable to trade unionists as a partner than is the Slovak prime minister. Perhaps you have more acceptable methods of partnership negotiations, but, other than that, the situation is also not ideal. The trade unions in the Czech Republic have built their authorities and have acquired respect. They are better prepared. In Slovakia, the situation is more complicated. Our people are more afraid today than they were under the communist regime. Social conditions have not improved but have deteriorated, and, moreover, people can lose even their poorly paid jobs if they are heard criticizing. The employer will implement so-called organizational changes precisely in accordance with regulations and the trade unions cannot do anything about it.

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PEN Blames Attack on Reporter on 'Ruling Power'

AU0811141295 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Nov 95 p 4

[Statement by the Slovak PEN Center: "Against Criminalization of Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak PEN Center Committee expresses solidarity with young Slovak journalist Peter Toth, who was perfidiously assaulted because he strove to fulfill his duty—to seek the truth about the circumstances of a criminal act, the abduction of a Slovak Republic citizen abroad. We are outraged about what happened. This is further proof of the growing brutality and aggressiveness in public life. We see therein another expression of curtailing democratic space and suppressing opposition views and freedom of speech on the part of the ruling power. We recall that, already in March 1994, an aggressive crowd at Primatial Square in Bratislava attacked four journalists. But the most recent attack was no longer merely an unrestrained explosion of passions; it was a criminal act prepared in cold blood. We justifiedly fear that, if the escalation of violence is given free rein, it will lead to political assassinations of journalists, as has already happened in other countries.

The Slovak PEN Center, proceeding from the PEN Charter, urgently calls upon the criminal prosecution bodies to investigate this deed without delay and consistently, and appeals to the responsible political representatives to put their entire authority behind the condemnation of such practices.

For the Slovak PEN Center Committee:

Martin Butora, chairman

Jan Strasser

Pavel Vilikovsky

'Anonymous Letter' Lists Envoys To Be Dismissed

AU0811141595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Nov 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by Julius Gembicky: "Will Almost One-Half of Ambassadors Be Replaced in Two Waves, or Will Only Those Be Recalled Who Have Been Serving Beyond Their Term of Office?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The NARODNA OBRODA editorial office has received an anonymous letter mailed from Bratislava. Anonymous letters usually end up in our wastebasket, but this one attracted our attention because it conspicuously tallied with information imparted by Maria Klimova, director of the Personnel Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, at a Bratislava rally with Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] voters in the first half of October. [passage omitted]

What Is in the Anonymous Letter?

"The purge at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic will, indeed, take place. The list of heads of Slovak Republic representative missions abroad to be dismissed has been prepared by J. Sestak [state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and E. Kuchar. It still requires approval from the HZDS. The purges will be carried out in two waves. The first wave comprises the embassies in Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Vatican, Paris, Helsinki, and Nicosia.

"In the second wave are Jakarta, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Vienna, Seoul, Washington, New York, Strasbourg, Geneva, UN Mission Vienna, Bonn, and Bern.

"It is not true that the heads of representative missions are staying beyond the set term of office. Likewise, it is not true that they are not performing their tasks. Only those who have been dispatched by the HZDS—Kral [ambassador to Switzerland], Kucera [ambassador to Croatia], and Mitrova [ambassador to Hungary]—are not performing their tasks."

Fax From the Spokesman

It is interesting that the information on the planned mass replacements of ambassadors reported by the unknown author has been confirmed to NARODNA OBRODA by some unofficial sources. We therefore sent a fax to Juraj Matejovsky, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, asking him to either confirm or deny the veracity of this information. In a faxed reply dated 31 October 1995, he let us know:

"Regarding your fax with questions about the personnel policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, we note that Juraj Schenk, minister of foreign affairs, and Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have already commented in the media on fundamental personnel policy issues. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic has also released a statement. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic will not deal in public with specific personnel issues." [passage omitted]

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Romanian, Hungarian Ethnic Issues Viewed

95CH0359A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 Aug 95 p 15

[Article by Bela Pogomats: "An Eighty-Year-Old Experiment; Lessons Learned From Hungarian-Romanian Negotiations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarians of Transylvania struggle for their autonomy today: They want to have their own network of schools, they want their churches to be free, and they want to use their native language freely. I could say: They struggle the same way as Romanians of Transylvania (and of Hungary) did prior to 1918, when they were a national minority, or, more precisely, the same way Romanian politicians of those days did, politicians, who have not given up their struggle for self-determination, autonomy of the Romanian masses who supported them since the Romanian national "awakening," i.e., since the late 18th century. This, more or less century-and-a-half-old Romanian political struggle teaches important lessons even in these days. These lessons should be considered by policymakers in Bucharest, as well as by Hungarian interest groups in Transylvania, because they could learn much from the perseverance manifested, and clever tactics used by the political, religious and intellectual leaders of Romanians of Transylvania to defend their national interests.

The ideal of Romanian self-governance appeared for the first time in 1891, in a petition entitled Supplex Libellus Valachorum. In it Romanian church and secular leaders requested the ruler to grant constitutional rights, and above all, self-rule to Romanians of Transylvania as a "fourth nation," in addition to the "three nations": the Hungarians, the Szeklers [subgroup of the Hungarian minority in the Transylvanian region of Romania], and the Saxons. The quickly organizing Transylvanian Romanian intelligentsia of the enlightenment and the reform age had the same thing in mind: the spring 1848 Romanian "national assembly" held in Balazsfalva [Blaj], which inscribed on its banner the ideal of Romanian national unity, and the memorandum of 1829, which was intended to call upon Francis Joseph I to represent the interests of Romanians and help Romanians attain self-governance, vis-a-vis the endeavors of Hungarian governments.

All these efforts stood in opposition to prevailing Hungarian policies, which intended to place the state organization on Hungarian national foundations ever since the intellectual fermentation that began after the death of Joseph II, which endeavored to integrate Transylvania, and manifested hardly any understanding of Romanian needs and demands, even though most of these demands were just, and most of which could have been satisfied without violating the integrity of the Hungarian state. Doubtless—history, at least, so indicates—Hungarian political leadership chose an inappropriate strategy in the course of Hungarian state consolidation that followed 1867: Instead of trying to build an "eastern Switzerland" in Transylvania, as recommended by many, Hungarian policies endeavored to radically repress Romanian national endeavors, thus virtually preparing the historical fate of a "Hungarian Transylvania."

Nevertheless, there were some attempted political endeavors to reconcile Transylvanian Hungarian and Romanian interests, which prompted at least consideration of Romanian demands for national autonomy. The most promising such attempt was linked to the name of Count Istvan Tisza, who held several (promising) negotiations between 1910 and 1914 with leaders of the Romanian National Party in order to at least partly satisfy the demands of Romanians of Transylvania and Hungary. These Romanian demands provide a lesson because they shed light on the manner in which Romanians, at that time in the minority, viewed the legal conditions and institutions needed from the standpoint of their own national survival and uplift. These were the same conditions and institutions as the ones consistently denied at present by the Bucharest Government to Hungarians in Romania, now in the minority.

Negotiations between the Hungarian Government and leaders of the Romanian National Party lasted for years. Istvan Tisza took the first step when he voiced the need for Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation in a speech delivered in Nagyvarad [Oradea] prior to the 1910 National Assembly elections. The foundations for reconciliation would have been established by Romanian leaders recognizing the constitutional framework of a dualist government organization, i.e., the recognition of the integral state concept of Hungary, while the Hungarian Government would have fulfilled the most important demands of the Romanians.

The Romanian National Party defined these demands in a memorandum dated 12 September 1910, and the demands were forwarded to the Hungarian Government on behalf of the National Party by Romanian politician Ioan Mihu. (The Hungarian Government was headed by Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary, while Tisza was the leader of the ruling Labor Party.) The memorandum actually based the demands on the 1868 "nationalities law" still in force at the time, but never implemented. Above all, the memorandum demanded the implementation of that law, and the liquidation of anti-Romanian measures taken by government administrative bodies earlier. In addition, the Romanians also demanded guarantees for

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the undisturbed operation of an independent Romanian political party; the introduction of universal suffrage and the holding of "clean" elections; the establishment of 50 Romanian voting districts; the use of the Romanian language as the official language in government administration and the administration of justice in areas inhabited by Romanians; the hiring of Romanian public employees; the full enforcement of the right of association and the right to assemble; the establishment of Romanian cultural funds, such as the theater fund; the autonomy of the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches, and state funding for Romanian churches; the introduction of Romanian language teaching in all schools in areas inhabited by Romanians (the repeal of the Albert Apponyi's 1907 school law); the establishment of Romanian state high schools (in addition to the existing parochial schools); the establishment of a Romanian division in the Ministry of Culture; the provision of economic aid to areas inhabited by Romanians; the halting of efforts to settle Hungarians; and finally, the free use of the Romanian national colors. The memorandum states the Romanian demands in a total of 22 points.

In the course of subsequent negotiations, and especially after he became the head of government in 1912, Tisza established the prospect of concessions in several respects. Thus, for example, he talked about the establishment of voting districts of a Romanian character, the founding of Romanian schools, the softening of Apponyi's law, the hiring of Romanian officials, alternatively the requirement that officials in Romanian inhabited areas be able to easily understand the language of the people entrusted to them. Other concessions were also the subjects of negotiations. Meanwhile the government tacitly permitted the use of the Romanian national flag, and even the singing of the national anthem which began with the words "Awaken, Romanian."

Negotiations progressed slowly and not quite smoothly, and by the spring of 1914 it seemed that the yearned-for Hungarian-Romanian agreement could be consummated sooner or later. In March 1914, Teodor Mihali (Tivadar Mihaly), a Romanian nationality representative, once again reiterated the 11-point demand of the Romanian National Party during debate in the house of representatives. These demands included the following: (1) education at all levels must be provided in the native language, including in schools supported by foundations; (2) freedom of the churches must be ensured; (3) freedom of the press must be ensured; (4) ethnic freedom and social development must be ensured; (5) the Romanian National Party's right to organize must be recognized; (6) language of the government administration must be Romanian in areas inhabited by Romanians; (7) Romanian language must be introduced in courts in areas inhabited by Romanians; (8) the state should provide support to backward Romanian areas equal to support provided to other areas; (9) the state should discontinue implementing its settlement policies directed against Romanians; (10) Romanian people should be represented in government administration and in courts of law by their own sons; and (11) the status of the Romanian people as a nation should be recognized and guaranteed.

Negotiations were disrupted at this point. The failure to succeed could also be credited to domestic policy considerations: Tisza did not want to, and could not surrender the political dogma of the dualist era, which regarded every citizen of Hungary, irrespective of his or her ethnic or linguistic background, as a member of the "united Hungarian political nation," while Romanians insisted that they be recognized as a nation and be granted collective rights. Along with this, the powerful group that rallied around Francis Ferdinand—the group that increasingly determined the policies of the Monarchy—as well as Hungarian national parties ceaselessly placed obstacles in the path of reconciliation attempts. (Members of the former group felt that a possible Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation would endanger the empire-building, confederacy plans of the Crown Prince, while the latter recognized every concession in the field of nationalities policies as violations of the concept of Hungarian statehood. This recognition was made blindly and mistakenly because the internal consolidation of a multinational country could have resulted in strengthening the Hungarian state....

Foreign policy problems also contributed to Istvan Tisza's fiasco, and the collapse of Hungarian-Romanian negotiations in the spring of 1914 was actually caused by these problems. The Bucharest Government initially approved of, and even supported the negotiations that began in 1910, because it envisioned a possibility for strengthening the Romanians of Transylvania. In the spring of 1914, however, Bucharest was no longer interested ["inquired"] in the cause of Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation: At that time, Romanian politicians already felt the winds of the force that would shake the world, and counted on the possibility that the soon-to-come international clash could open the door to Romanian aspirations aiming for the possession of the eastern part of Hungary. Irredentism gained strength in Bucharest, and plans to acquire territory could not be reconciled with the idea of reconciliation between Hungary and Romania. For this reason, Bucharest advised Transylvanian Romanian politicians negotiating with Istvan Tisza to be cautious and to retreat. Negotiations that have been going on for 80 years now, provide certain lessons that continue to be valid to this date. Namely, the Transylvanian Romanian politicians con-

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sistently demanded rights from the Hungarian Government, which today's Bucharest Government consistently denies to Hungarians of Transylvania, for example, the recognition of national individuality and identity, education in the native tongue, the free and full use of the native tongue in government administration and in courts, the maintenance of the integrity of homogeneous ethnic communities, and the unrestricted use of national symbols. Do we see a Romanian policy that would be willing to provide state funding for the establishment of Hungarian schools, support the establishment of schools by Hungarian churches, permit the use of the Hungarian language as an official language, do away with state settlement policies which aim for the ravaging of the ethnic character of Hungarian cities and areas, and permit the use of Hungarian national symbols?

Hungarians from Transylvania would probably approve if, at present while it is in power, Bucharest would introduce the reform measures the Romanian National Party demanded 80 years ago. It is a shame that Europe silently tolerates this dual thinking and assessment, and does not forcefully demand for Hungarians all that it demanded in those days for the Romanians.

Peter Kiss Accepts Nomination as Labor Minister

LD0811211495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Peter Kiss, deputy of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], will undertake the leadership of the Labor Ministry. The MSZP deputy has agreed with the prime minister on the conditions, thus, Gyula Horn will initiate the parliamentary hearing of Peter Kiss in a few days. The Socialist politician can take office next month as the successor to Mrs. Magda Kosa, nee Kovacs.

Party Leader on Importance of Political Stability

AU0711174195 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 4 Nov 95 p 10

[Interview with FIDESZ Deputy Chairman Tamas Deutsch by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "There Was No Time for Self-Pity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] In your view, what exactly is the task of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] as an opposition party today?

[Deutsch] The rims that were squeezing the Hungarian society dropped with the change in the regime in 1989-90. However, the connecting fibers of the society have loosened over the past five years and disintegration processes have increased in society and the economy. Lack of solidarity has become increasingly characteristic of almost all areas of public life. The major task of the FIDESZ is the same as that of other responsible political forces, namely, to try to turn these threatening processes around in some way. Party political issues are not the basic political issues for us today. At the moment, we are not focusing on how the opposition parties could win in the next elections; instead, we are focusing on whether or not the basic change in the regime that started in 1989-90 will continue. Of course, in connection with this, the creation of a political shift system [valtogazdalkodas] based on competition between firm center-right and center-left political groupings is a key issue. We do not have much time. The chances were created for basic changes in 1989-90 and the process has begun. The coming years will tell whether this change in the regime will continue in the political situation that emerged after the 1994 elections. Unfortunately, on the basis of the events that have taken place in the past 18 months, it could easily happen that the goals of the change in the regime formulated in 1989-90 will become secondary. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What personnel means does the FIDESZ have for its political activity?

[Deutsch] The FIDESZ is constantly strengthening and its political infrastructure is increasing. In my opinion, however, it is impossible to provide a real alternative to the present coalition without cooperation among the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], and the FIDESZ. The experience of two parliamentary elections shows that the three parties together can obtain at least 25-30 percent of the vote and as much as 60 percent. The question is whether we can send most deputies into parliament on the basis of the votes given to the three parties together within the framework of an election pact, or split the votes among ourselves by running separately and competing against one another.

[Pinter] In your view, when is a common stand viable?

[Deutsch] When there are still opportunities to prepare a common policy and a common presentation of a government alternative. The sooner the better. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] It is impossible to implement the goals of a parliamentary democracy without political stability. In your view, what is the current stability sufficient for?

[Deutsch] At the moment, the problem is precisely a lack of stability. We can speak of neither political stability nor calm political activity without the existence of stable parties. Minimal organizational infrastructure is the elementary condition for the stability of political parties. Hungarian society has foolish ideas about allegedly

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huge budget support for political parties and about their huge properties and apparatus. The reality is that, in this respect, the parties are in a difficult situation, except the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], which has a stronger infrastructure than the others. The delay in preparing the new constitution, the unclear status of the president of the republic, the increasing number of questions regarding the authority of Constitutional Court, and the lack of a media law on the openness of political life are causing instability. The desperate squabble among unstable parties threatens the political stability and a well-founded political and professional debate among stable parties, which often becomes quite violent, strengthens political stability. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What is the future of relations between the FIDESZ and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]?

[Deutsch] The fact that, by discarding the alliance with us, the SZDSZ formed a coalition with the MSZP, which already had an absolute majority in the National Assembly and so was able to govern alone, and was a party whose program contradicted the goals of our alliance, means that the SZDSZ has lost the opportunity of cooperation with the FIDESZ for a long time. In addition, the SZDSZ-MSZP pair is more than a coalition between two parties from a certain point of view. This coalition carries the possibility of a reunited left wing. A split took place on the Hungarian left wing after the communists took power. After the elimination of the moderate center-left, the Communist Party alone represented the left. The hard-line trend and the revisionist trend also split at the time, but the spiritual heirs of these two trends have found themselves today in this coalition. No doubt, both trends have changed considerably. The revisionist left-wing, which makes up a considerable part of the spiritual roots of the SZDSZ, has come to deny the basic values of communism. In the case of the SZDSZ, anticommunism was not only a slogan, but this party's ideology remained within the framework of the left. Today, the SZDSZ has clearly become a party with a social-liberal ideology placed in the moderate center-left. The SZDSZ has consistently implemented the formation of its current image. With the exception of Peter Tolgyessy, the SZDSZ has already discarded everyone who did not identify with this choice of values. [passage omitted]

Military Airfields Considered for Civil Aviation

AU0811144595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 8 Nov 95 p 6

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jozsef Kaszper, commander of the tactical air force unit in Kapos, by "Gulyas"; place and date not given: "Civil Aircraft Among Combat Aircraft?—Somogy County Has Eye on Military Airfield"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The increase in international contacts in the past four or five years, that is, the increase in the exchange of goods, has forced local governments in several regions of Hungary to consider the possibilities of air transport instead of the increasingly expensive road and rail transportation. The use of military airports could be one of the most efficient means, because only the military airports in the provinces have the infrastructure required by international regulations

Somogy County also has an eye on a military airfield, the Taszar Airfield, one of the most up-to-date airfields, and one that, given its geographic position, could become a major center for international trade in the Alps-Adria region, and would actually open a way for the whole South Dunantul region to South and West Europe.

The Somogy County general meeting, the civilian body that is calling for the mixed use of the aforementioned military airfield, which is located 7 kilometers from Kaposvar, recently handed in a proposal to the State Area Development Institute to commission a study for Taszar airfield where, according to optimistic calculations, civil aircraft loaded with goods might be able to land within two years.

We asked Jozsef Kaszper, commander of the Taszar military airfield, about this bold plan.

[Kaszper] Given the fact that the construction of civilian airports, which require a lot of land, is a problem all over the world, mixed airports are quite common. For example, such mixed civilian-military airfields work very well in Germany. It is also an important factor, especially in Hungary, that maintenance expenses would be divided up in the course of using a military airfield for civilian purposes.

[Gulyas] Does this mean that the military airports can be easily "conquered?"

[Kaszper] Of course not, because there are still two serious obstacles. One of them is that the electronic and landing control systems are based on Russian technology, and the language of the various machines, instruments, and installations is in Russian. At the same time, civil aviation is obliged to use the international air transportation system, the ICAO, so Hungary's military airfields would have to be technically "reset" to ICAO standards.

[Gulyas] As we know, the language used by flight control, airfield personnel, and pilots cannot remain Hungarian either. Do the combat aircraft pilots speak

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English? What about those who will serve in civil aviation?

[Kaszper] Our pilots are intensively learning English, but their language training has not yet been concluded. The future civilian air controllers should already start learning English and get acquainted with the English-language control and landing systems. Only this way can we hope that both civilian and military aircraft will be able to land on the same airfield within four or five years.

[Gulyas] Will the airfield commanders who "allow" civilians on military premises violate military secrets?

[Kaszper] You should not think that, in case of mixed use, Taszar airport will become a "free passage house." We can share the navigational systems, but the barracks will remain under military control. The civilian part will work in a separate area, and customs and passport control will also take place in a separate area.

[Gulyas] This means that unauthorized people will not be able to get close to the JAS-39 Gripen combat aircraft that Sweden is now offering Hungary, aircraft about which opinions differ. In your view, are these good combat aircraft?

[Kaszper] I was mainly trained in combat strategy and regional security policy at the U.S. military academy, so I do not have thorough knowledge of the technical and tactical performance of these aircraft and of the fine differences among various combat aircraft. I can state, however, that there are no big differences between the modern combat aircraft today, namely, between the Mirage, F-16, F-18, and JAS-39 Gripen. The Gripen can be equipped with the same armament—bombs and missiles—as the U.S. combat aircraft, so the Swedish combat aircraft is actually not inferior to the U.S. combat aircraft, although the latter have already been tested in some air combat.

[Gulyas] The commander of an air force unit cannot interfere in the decision on whether to replace the old MiG-21 and MiG-23's with Swedish or U.S. combat aircraft. However, I think it is not a secret that rather obsolete combat aircraft are crossing the skies in the South-Dunantul airspace.

[Kaszper] Of course, it is not a secret that it is more difficult and more expensive to get spare parts for Russian aircraft, and servicing these aircraft is also more difficult, because we receive the spare parts from Russia in U.S. dollars today, or we pay for them in some other way. In the case of new and modern combat aircraft, the major criterion is how these aircraft can be adapted to the current system. I must stress that I do not have the authority to influence the purchase of combat aircraft, but I can say that the Hungarian Air Force needs modern combat aircraft.

No Agreement in Army, Police Wage Dispute Talks

LD0911095695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 9 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks over the wage dispute between the government and the trade union of the employees of armed and police forces have ended with no agreement. The trade union, representing policemen, border guards, prison officers, firemen, customs officers, and employees of the army, is still considering holding nationwide demonstrations.

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Rohde Released After Milosevic Mediation

LD0811185395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1741 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dayton, 8 Nov (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Serb Republic authorities today released U.S. journalist David Rohde and handed him over to the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. This was achieved through the mediation efforts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia delegation attending Dayton talks.

TANJUG has learned from sources close to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Dayton that the 'CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR' correspondent was released after several contacts between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, head of the Yugoslav delegation, and the Serb Republic leadership.

Rhode, Zagreb correspondent for the MONITOR, was arrested on 29 October in the Zvornik area, in the northeastern part of the Serb Republic.

Serbs Drop Charges

LD0811155595 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, in accordance with his constitutional and legal authority, today adopted the decision to drop charges against American journalist David Rohde, the office for press contacts of the Serb Republic announced.

On 29 October 1995, David Rohde, who works for the Boston-based CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR and is its Zagreb-based correspondent for the former Yugoslavia, used forged public documents to enter the Serb Republic with the task of obtaining military and other information in the zone of combat operations in the Zvornik area, with the intention of passing this information on to the Muslim side and to one Western country.

To this end and for a promised monetary reward, on 29 October, David Rohde photographed military and other facilities deep inside the territory of our republic, despite being aware that photographing these facilities, which are of special importance to the Serb Republic, was not permitted. According to a statement by David Rohde, the information gathered was used, among other things, as a means of exerting additional pressure on the Serb side during the current peace process.

'1. e competent authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered the detention of David Rohde before bringing official charges against him for the criminal act of espionage, in accordance with Article 128, paragraph one, of the Criminal Law of the Serb Republic, which envisions for such a crime a prison sentence of at least three years.

Guided by the national interests of the Serb Republic, the president of the republic made this decision [to drop the charges against Rohde] as a gesture of goodwill and as a contribution to the peace process for resolving the Yugoslav and Bosnian crisis, concludes the public statement from the office of the Serb Republic's president.

French Official Links Sanctions to Missing Pilots

AU0811210695 Paris AFP in English 2027 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Paris, Nov 8 (AFP)—France Wednesday [8 November] linked the lifting of an international trade embargo against Belgrade, and thereby a political solution to the Balkan conflict, to the fate of two French pilots believed to be held by Bosnian Serbs.

Foreign Minister Herve de Charette said Serb negotiators in Dayton, Ohio, had been told that sanctions would not be lifted so long as the pilots, downed during NATO air raids at the end of August, remained missing.

"We sent the message clearly to Serb officials that, when it comes to lifting the sanctions which are hurting the Belgrade government, the question of the fate of pilots could not leave us indifferent," he said in a television interview. [passage omitted]

France, as a permanent member of the Council, could in theory veto any attempt to lift the sanctions altogether, as would be expected as part of an overall settlement to the conflict in the region. [passage omitted]

De Charette however said he was "confident" over the prospects of success for the Dayton talks, which have been going on behind closed doors since the end of October.

He said France was playing "an important role" in the talks, and that it was not a "pax americana." [passage omitted]

Report Views SDA Conflict With Studio 99

AU0811195995 London WARREPORT in English Oct 95 p 21-22

[Report by Drazena Peranic, features writer in Sarajevo for the Alternative Information Network: "Arson at Studio 99; Tensions Between the Independent Media Group and the Sarajevo Ruling Establishment Have Finally Flared"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At four in the morning on September 16 about 180,000 DM ($126,000) worth

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of Studio 99 equipment was destroyed in Sarajevo, including their main radio and TV transmitter, probably by arson from political opponents, who, it is suspected, may be linked to a wing of the ruling Party for Democratic Action.

Studio 99 has certainly been a thorn in the side of the ruling establishment in Sarajevo. The station stands out for a multicultural, multi-ethnic, democratic and secular Bosnia-Herzegovina. It consists of three media: the radio, which began in December 1992, just before the war began; the TV, which started under UNESCO auspices at the beginning of this year; and the Review of Free Thought, which began this May. The magazine, and many of the operation's other activities, are prepared in close collaboration with the association of independent intellectuals called Circle 99.

The nationalist wing of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] have strongly opposed 99, because it is so open to many civic ideas and initiatives, and supports a truly democratic and multiethnic society. For instance, the station was interrupted for a few days in September 1994, when the stateowned and SDA-controlled radio and television RTB-H [Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina] confiscated its transmitter. The move was in reaction to an interview with Fikret Abdic, then still a legitimate member of the Bosnian presidency. The confiscation of the transmitter prevented the broadcasting of an interview that would be inconvenient for the authorities. Political divisions between Fikret Abdic and President Alija Izetbegovic were topical issues at the time, and the first armed conflicts between Abdic's troops and the Bosnian Army broke out soon after that.

Especially since the beginning of 1993, pressure exerted on the associates of Studio 99 seemed to be in retaliation for programmes which presented the opinions of citizens on political processes leading to the ethnic division of BH, or political commentaries about acts of discrimination against people of different ethnicity or religion. The public criticism and attacks against the radio station and its founder, editor-in-chief Adil Kulenovic, have been led by party-controlled and nationalist journals such as LJILJAN, AVAZ, MUSLIMANSKI GLAS or Radio Hayat. Leading members of the SDA and the Islamic religious community, and even Izetbegovic himself, have voiced their negative views of the station .

Often the popular "99" journalists have been forced to leave their posts to dig trenches at demarcation lines as a penalty for refusing to toe the ruling party line. Three out of the 13 permanently employed are required for such duty now. This July, threatening that the entire team of journalists would be taken to the front-line, the authorities demanded that the station's re- broadcast of Radio Free Europe be interrupted, after it carried news about the latest shelling of the city. Military police broke into the studio and threatened to close it down and ban broadcasting because of the news broadcast that day. When the Radio Free Europe broadcasts continued, inexplicable daily disturbances and interference began to occur exactly at the same time reports from "unseemly" correspondents from Belgrade and Zagreb were broadcast. Then video cassettes disappeared from the premises of the editorial staff with material recorded at the meeting of the opposition from the territory controlled by the B-H Army headed by vice-president of the opposition United Bosnian Social Democrats, Sejfudin Tokic, and with the opposition from the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs headed by Milorad Dodik, president of the club of independent representatives from Banja Luka. As independent media, only Studio 99 and the Alternative Information Network (AIM) were accredited to report from the meeting-but without the tapes, in vain.

When Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic offered his resignation, the crew of Studio 99 allowed its listeners to give their opinions about the conflict between him and Izetbegovic in its most popular phone-in programme. The public's sharp criticism of Izetbegovic and the SDA leadership, and the support offered to Silajdzic, was decisive for the prime minister's survival. However, it resulted in accusations by leading SDA members that Studio 99 was behind the "Sarajevo-Tuzla conspiracy" in favour of Silajdzic and against Izetbegovic.

The latest Geneva agreement, intensified the intolerance of the authorities against Studio 99, because it gave air time to citizens who denounced the agreement as a "betrayal of Bosnia." As they themselves admitted, members of the elite units of the Bosnian Army also appeared on the programme claiming that the station was "a hotbed of Chetniks because by preserving a united B-H it wants to preserve a joint life with the Chetniks!" However there were signs that the attacks had moved beyond the verbal when, at the beginning of September, it was noticed that another cable, causing interruptions to the programming, was illegally fastened on to the main power supply cable of the transmitter of RTV 99. Two RTV 99 workers who disconnected the illegally hooked up cable were shot at and threatened by exclamations such as "we will stop you!" "You, Adil's gang!" And ominously, "We will destroy your equipment!" These warnings came from the Dreca family, whose son Tarik Dreca, an SDA official, works in the Islamic humanitarian organisation .

Immediately afterwards, an abusive e-mail message was sent from that organisation, challenging the 99

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maintenance workers to a duel, and threatening to damage the station's equipment if any attempt was made to interfere with "borrowing" the studio's power. That such threats could be made with impunity suggest the confidence of the perpetrators that the authorities would not take any action.

This message was submitted to the police, but nothing was done until the demolition of the equipment ten days later. Then the Security Service Centre of Sarajevo were notified again, and they investigated the site. The studio stated, "We believe that the competent authorities in Sarajevo will do their best to shed light on the background of this event, and by publicising the whole truth about it, remove all possible highly negative ideological and political connotations which might result from it."

The actions of the "competent authorities" will test whether the ruling structure in Sarajevo has sunk so deep into despotism and nationalism that it will envisage the open destruction of everything that does not fit into its vision of future Bosnia. Hopes that the war is coming to an end do not mean that the struggle for a democratic, multi-ethnic and multireligious Bosnia-Herzegovina is over. Offering an alternative to the ethnic intolerance and nationalistic apartheids, independent RTV Studio 99 will go on. The latest news from Sarajevo is that the station has been linked to an auxiliary transmitter of much smaller power and far smaller range, but it is still broadcasting.

Economic, Trade Agreement Signed With Turkey

AU0811212395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An agreement on economic and trade cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey was signed in Istanbul yesterday [7 November]. The agreement was signed by Dzemal Cabaravdic, deputy minister of trade in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nedzad Ernen, Turkish state undersecretary for trade with other countries. They also discussed the steps needed to be taken in order to implement the signed agreement.

They agreed to exchange draft agreements on double taxation and the protection of investments in the days ahead. The governments will also be recommended to sign an agreement on financial cooperation and to set up a joint bank. The initiative on setting up a Turkish-Bosnian bank was also revived.

The delegation of the Trade Ministry also held a meeting with a business community of Turkey with which it discussed a proposal to set up a Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina-Turkey business council.

Kasagic: Patriotic Front 'Harming Serb Interests'

AU0811144295 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Nov 95 p 2

[Interview with Rajko Kasagic, "prime minister designate" of the Bosnian Serbs, by Zeljko Kopanja; place and date not given: "The Enemy Wants To Divide Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kopanja] The Patriotic Front, an organization that pools several political parties and individuals, among whom are also generals of the Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] army, has recently appeared on the political scene in Banja Luka. What is your opinion about their accusations of the state leadership, whom they accuse of crime, political manipulation, and also the selling out of the Krajina's [western Bosnia-Herzegovina] interests?

[Kasagic] They, and I refer to the groups around the Patriotic Front, sense that peace is close and that the moment to seize power has come. They do not choose their means. They are inventing accusations and slanders. Some retired generals with the halo of undefeated commanders are also clamoring. However, they deliberately neglect that they where undefeated generals when they faced a poorly armed and disorganized enemy. I would like to ask them how they would act now that the Serbs have been hit by the well armed Muslim army [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army], the Croat Defense Council, and finally the regular troops of Croatia, with the support of NATO air power, which mercilessly bombed Serb positions. Therefore, these are some individual retired generals beating their chests without any reason and all this is sheer abuse of the popularity won in the struggle that took place in conditions entirely different from the present ones. As for the Patriotic Front, I must state my opinion that their objective is to acquire power even if it costs the loss of the state. They are miserable souls, who claim that a crime is being committed without specifying what crime or who precisely is committing it, and whose only aim is to seize power. They are greatly harming Serb interests without even knowing how much. For that reason I pray to God that He may forgive their souls.

[Kopanja] The existence of the new Radio Krajina, which is backed by the Patriotic Front, has become a number one political issue. What is your opinion about this radio station and its guests?

[Kasagic] The fact is that Radio Krajina is a pirate radio station without a broadcasting license. The revelation

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that these men have locked themselves in a military command post in a building protected by "Zoljas" [64-mm portable rocket launchers] says enough about these people. One thing is for sure: Had they filed a request with the information ministry, they would have obtained a broadcasting license in a regular way. However, in their application they would also have had to state their program. They wish to separate themselves from the state, broadcast programs attacking people without any proof. They speak about democracy, but guard this democracy with Zoljas; they do not recognize the state and violate the regulations that this state has passed but simultaneously live in this state. I have nothing against those who do not belong to the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] but blame the existing authorities for this or that, although their criticisms are most frequently unsubstantiated. The fact that some individuals use Radio Krajina's airwaves to insult and attack without any proof is primarily a problem of their morality.

However, as a man who has belonged to the Serb national movement and the SDS from the very begining, it is my right to be angry with those SDS members who are directly in positions of authority and at the same time spit at those same authorities. They are actually spitting at themselves. There are people, such as the director of the Banja Luka clinical center or president of the Banja Luka municipal assembly, for example, who directly hold positions of authority and have great power to improve things and achieve progress within the boundaries of their incumbencies, but instead their role has been reduced to criticism of the current authorities. Then there are people who used to be deputies in the people's assembly, but got tired of it. They left for other positions. They would now like the country to collapse and are constantly undermining the authorities, but they forget that until yesterday they had held the most important posts in this same authority.

[Kopanja] You yourself have said that Radio Krajina is protected in the military command by "Zoljas." Is this not an indicator of truly "strained" relations between the civilian and the military authorities?

[Kasagic] This country is not interested in closing down every little pirate station at all costs. It may be good that some individuals are showing their true faces on its airwaves. I am convinced that their appearances have the opposite effect of what they would like to achieve. As far as I know, cooperation between the general staff and the supreme command is extremely good. There are no problems there. In this sense it is naturally not up to the general staff or the supreme command to resolve the issue of the existence of Radio Krajina. This is a matter of the information ministry. Whether the information ministry resolves this through negotiations or by force, I do not know. I do know that I favor the former method.

[Kopanja] You were in the Serb Republic delegation that recently visited Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Bearing in mind that the success of your government depends on the fate of the embargo on the Drina, can we expect any changes?

[Kasagic] The cooperation with Serbia and Yugoslavia in the realm of politics has already started. I expect that cooperation in industry and economic relations will also resume soon. As for Serbia's attitude toward the Serbs across the Drina, I believe that what was done at a given moment was primarily to save what could be saved. Namely, we must not forget that the most powerful international force struck at the Serb people, unjustly, of course, with the support of the entire Western world. I believe that now, following the coordination of a political platform for the negotiations of the Serb Republic and Yugoslavia, the picture of the Serbs will start to change in the world. The world has begun to realize that the Serbs favor peace and that they would like to lead a free life just like other nations. At the meeting with the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia that I attended, we achieved unity, it seems to me. If we had only had such a meeting a year earlier! My conclusion after the meeting was that we in the Serb Republic were demanding more from Serbia and Yugoslavia than they could objectively give us. I do not believe that we understood them sufficiently or they us. Of the embargo on the Drina, I must say that President Milosevic did not speak about it on that occasion, especially not about abolishing the embargo. This is a far more complex problem that we can comprehend from our angle. However, I have a feeling that when the conditions are met and trade picks up from one side and the other, the inevitability of making some painful decisions would be understood. I am convinced that Mr. Milosevic advocates the interests of the Serbian people. He told us openly: "Do not believe that I do not espouse the interests of the Serbian people but somebody else's." I am convinced that once the world allows our cooperation, which should happen soon, the blockade on the Drina will be lifted. We just have to trust each other more and everything will be all right.

[Kopanja] You have not formed your cabinet yet. When will the new makeup of the Serb Republic government be known?

[Kasagic] I will be travelling to Pale this week formally to take up the post of the previous prime minister, Dusan Kozic. I already have some ideas about some new departments and also some new people in the

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government. I will be consulting President Karadzic on everything and, after that, the profile of the new government will be known to the public. [passage omitted]

Patriotic Front Responds

AU0711164295 (Clandestine) Krajina Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Krajina Patriotic Front has issued the following announcement:

In spite of scanty information about the progress of the negotiating process that is to determine the destiny of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Krajina Patriotic Front contends that the demands by international potentates, poisoned by hatred toward the Serbs, for the condemnation or extradition of Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and Lieutenent General Ratko Mladic, Serb Republic Army commander-in-chief—actually constitutes a condemnation of the Serb nation in general and its extradition to The Hague Tribunal.

Regarding the forming of a joint left [udruzena ljevica] on the territory of the Serb Republic, the Krajina Patriotic Front holds that demands for a defeated formula of brotherhood and unity during civil war do not contribute to the defense of the Serb Republic and the Serb nation in general.

In reaction to an interview with Mr. Rajko Kasagic, unconfirmed prime minister-designate of the Serb Republic, by GLAS SRPSKI of 6 November, the Krajina Patriotic Front would like to warn the prime minister-designate and the Serb public about the following:

Democratic societies follow a set democratic procedure in making the prime minister-designate a prime minister, and we hope that the Serb Republic deputies will follow it closely at the next session of the National Assembly. A prime minister-designate who uses special cables to light his own house does not have a moral right to talk about shortages or the redistribution of electric power on the territory of the Serb Republic. The inhabitants of the Banja Luka region will remember him as the prime minister of darkness [mrak mandatar]. A man who offends the dignity of the families of dead soldiers by asking them in which units they are fighting—he is not worthy of becoming prime minister! Consequently, the Krajina Patriotic Front demands a public apology from Mr. Kasagic. Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic is expected to withdraw the candidacy of Rajko Kasagic for the position of prime minister-designate. If our demands regarding the prime minister-designate are not met, we will be forced to organize peaceful rallies in Banja Luka to point out all the virtues and faults of the unconfirmed prime minister-designate, ends the statement by the Krajina Patriotic Front.

Pale Officials Seen 'Attacking Their Own Army'

AU0811181195 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Nov 95 p 14

[Report by N.P.: "Milovanovic: The Authorities in Pale Are the Only Authorities in History That Are Attacking Their Own Army"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] SRPSKA VOJSKA magazine published by the General Staff of the army of the Serb Republic [RS] carried in its latest issue an interview with Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic. Milovanovic, chief of staff of the General Staff of the RS army, answered among other things, the questions concerning the loss of territory in western Bosnia and relations between the military and civilian RS leaderships. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the attempt to replace some members of the General Staff, he said that this really amounted to shifting responsibility from the civilian and state leaders to the army.

"I would like to say in particular that the pressure on the army is enormous. The army is being blamed for everything, and is not given credit for anything. All contacts with other countries, for instance with Yugoslavia, Greece, and now Russia, were established by the army, very few by the state. I can no longer understand the behavior of some individuals in the authorities who are not missing a single chance to attack the army, which they command. They are the only authorities in history and on this planet that are attacking their own army, with which they can either win or lose the war. This army is theirs, their deed, their product. This is same as if I were to criticize my family for being ill-mannered, and yet I am the one who is the most responsible for it."

UN Official Warns Abuses Threaten Balkans Peace

AU0811153295 Paris AFP in English 1610 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Nov 8 (AFP)—Continuing human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia threaten to compromise any peace agreement, the UN rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavia Elisabeth Rehn said Wednesday [8 November].

"Without genuine improvements in the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, any peace agreement will not have a solid foundation," Rehn said, as US-brokered peace efforts continued in Dayton, Ohio, in

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her first mission report, a copy of which was obtained by AFP.

The former Finnish defence minister added that "effective protection of human rights in the whole region under international supervision" should be ensured.

Rehn, who succeeded Poland's Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September, is to report back to the UN general assembly on her tour of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and rump Yugoslavia between October 9 and 13.

Mazowiecki resigned in protest after the UN failed to make good on a pledge to protect the eastern enclave of Srebrenica. An estimated 8,000 Moslem men are still missing, believed massacred, after the UN-designated safe area fell on July 11.

Rehn called for the international community to set up a surveillance mechanism and said the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights must be given the support and necessary finances.

"Reconstruction aid must be made conditional on meaningful progress on human rights," she said.

Meanwhile, she said, "cases of mass killings of civilians, torture, other forms of harassment, looting of property and the burning of houses are still being reported.

"A large number of people are unaccounted for and new cases of missing persons have reported. There are more and more poeple who are fleeing their homelands."

Rehn called on Bosnian Serb authorities to allow international observers access to the territories they control, especially in the regions of Banja Luka and Srebrenica.

Her report underlines there are "strong indications" a majority of the 8,000 Bosnian Moslems, about whom there has been no news, were massacred when Serbs took the eastern Bosnian enclave earlier this year.

Persecution and harassment of non-Serb minorities is continuing in the Banja Luka region, in Serb-held territory in northwestern Bosnia, Rehn added.

"A vast majority" of adult men are carrying out forced labour, such as digging trenches near the front lines, in dangerous conditions, she said, adding that women and old people have been chased away.

Rehn also accused the Croatians of killings, starting house fires and expelling Serbs from the breakaway Krajina Serb region during and after the Croatian government's lightning offensive in August.

Serbs still in the region see their human rights "constantly violated," she said, and charged that Croatian authorities "bear the full responsibility for the situation."

The humanitarian situation of some 25,000 Bosnian Moslems who supported the dissident Moslem warlord Fikret Abdic and who fled to Croatia when the Bihac enclave in western Bosnia fell last summer was "extremely difficult," citing sexual violence against them by Bosnian troops.

Rehn considered that no progress had been made in returning thousands of refugees from all over the former Yugoslavia.

Minister Comments on Status of Returning Refugees

AU0811201895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 95

[Report by Samir Huseinovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The continuation of the 77th session of the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held today. In the part that was open to the public, the government discussed the realization of the conclusions on the return of refugees and displaced persons to Bugojno, Jajce, Travnik, and Stolac. It also discussed a report on the collection of customs and other duties on the territory of the Federation. Samir Huseinovic has the details.

[Huseinovic] The report concerning the organized return of refugees and displaced persons to the newly liberated areas was prepared by Minister Muharem Cero.

The organized return of the refugees to the Una-Sana Canton has been started in cooperation with the relevant cantonal-municipal entities of the Central-Bosnian, Zenica-Doboj, and Banja Luka districts.

In the period between 10 October and 7 November of this year, about 5,000 refugees were taken back to their homes. There were also some spontaneous returns, and in the past two months some 10,000 displaced persons returned to these areas. Additional distribution of humanitarian aid was organized for all those who have returned to their homes. Preparations for the opening of the distribution logistics center for the Banja Luka district are under way in Kljuc.

The process of returning displaced persons to their homes is related to the serious financial situation, but the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has nevertheless secured certain funds for the realization of the program. [passage omitted]

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Muslims, Croats Said Forming Ethnic 'Ghettos'

LD0711232195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2307 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 7 (TANJUG)—The United Nations on Tuesday expressed extreme concern that Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forming 'ethnically pure ghettos' in Serb territories which they captured in the latest offensive.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees representatives also expressed concern over actions by the Croat side which is preventing Muslims from returning to areas where they had lived before, agencies report.

Muslim forces and forces of Bosnian Croats, backed by troops from neighboring Croatia, captured 13 Serb municipalities during their autumn offensive in western and central parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and forced about 200,000 Serbs to flee their homes.

'In recent weeks more than 10,000 displaced persons from central and northwestern Bosnia have been involuntarily relocated to new territories in (the western Bosnian region of) Bosanska Krajina,' said chief of mission for the UNHCR Damaso Feci.

'The pattern of these forcible relocations clearly indicates that they are motivated by political considerations and the consolidation of military conquests,' he said, adding that these were mostly areas controlled by Bosnian Croats and that UNHCR representatives were not allowed access to groups of refugees.

UNHCR Spokesman Kris Janowski said the position of the Croat side was especially worring since they were preventing Muslims from returning to areas where they had lived earlier.

Speaking about the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Janowski said both sides had allegedly accepted the concept of a multi-ethnic state but were distributing the population in the field according to an ethnic principle, both on the lines of separation and in captured Serb territories.

Janowski warned that the U.N. would probably see a kind of 'resettlement creating basically ethically pure ghettoes,' which would mean that both sides were trying to get out of the obligations they undertook when they agreed to form a multi-ethnic community.

Sarajevo Plans New Gas Distribution System

AU0711195695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Nov 95

[Interview with Nermin Pecanac, deputy head of the Sarajevo Executive Council, by Senada Cumurovic, in Sarajevo on 7 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Cumurovic] One of the places where the energy situation in Sarajevo, the situation regarding natural gas in particular, was discussed today, was the extraordinary session of the Executive Council of Sarajevo. Mr. Pecanac, what is happening with the energy situation according to your information and the information that could be heard at the session?

[Pecanac] Regarding natural gas, we in the Executive Council decided today to introduce a new system of the redistribution of natural gas, and the decisions on it will apply to 24 hours at the time. [passage omitted]

According to our information, the main reason for the shortage of gas in Sarajevo is the fact that the Committee for Sanctions has not approved the increase in supply of natural gas to Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, the statements made by UN officials that unsettled bills are the reason are incorrect. [passage omitted]

[Cumurovic] As Nermin Pecan told us, although the possibility of introducing electricity cuts was considered, the regular supply of electricity will remain as it is.

The water situation is normalizing after a disruption in the work of the Bacevo well.

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Tudjman Arrives in U.S. for Peace Talks

LD0911100195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 9 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman arrived at the U.S. Wright-Patterson military base early this morning. He and presidents Alija Izetbegovic and Slobodan Milosevic and international peace mediators are going to continue negotiations on the former Yugoslavia. President Tudjman is being accompanied in the U.S. by head of the president's office and head of the Croatian Government's delegation in charge of negotiations with the Serbs of east Slavonia Hrvoje Sarinic.

Zagreb TV on E. Slavonia Negotiations

LD0911003695 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 8 Nov 95

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The biggest stumbling block in Dayton is the issue of reintegrating eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem. This is also the key issue for Croatia. But it has produced problems for negotiators Galbraith and Stoltenberg, who have been tasked with bringing the Serb insurgents to their senses.

[Unidentified correspondent over archive video of Galbraith and Stoltenberg] The news that Galbraith and Stoltenberg today postponed their return trip to Dayton leads to the conclusion that negotiations with the local Serbs have not finished in the way that the mediators had announced on their arrival in Croatia on the basis of Milosevic's promises. The local Serbs said Galbraith's offer was unacceptable because it meant reintegration within a 30-day deadline—a timescale envisaged for demilitarization—and it also included the deployment of the Croatian police along borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and all this with an unspecified time for the transition period.

Contrary to this, they want the UN mandate to be prolonged, UN forces deployed even after the expiration of the three year transition period; they also want UN forces to control Croatia's eastern borders. They say they have accepted demilitarization and accepted to give up political sovereignty which will be ceded to the United Nations. Do different proposals in Galbraith's and Serb agreement mean the end of the peace process? Judging by Arkan, who is hastily dismantling his petrol stations—they do. Moreover, his behavior reveals what sort of outcome he is expecting in the event of war. General Loncar also wants a war, but unlike Arkan he is certain of victory.

Contrary to them, other local negotiators are acting exclusively according to Milosevic's advice from Dayton. If he failed to annex them, Milosevic is now trying—in simultaneous negotiations—to use the reintegration of the occupied area of Croatia to achieve the best possible result in negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are certain indicators that Croatian Serbs, on advice from Dayton, undermined Galbraith and Stoltenberg's intentions. Milosevic's orders were that the envoys should be given an open signal of the Serb refusal to accept the agreement and at the same time insist on the fact that the talks have not been interrupted, which is best illustrated by all Serb media reports.

Only when he becomes certain that he has achieved a good agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, will Milosevic be able to resolve the issue of eastern Slavonia without any personal risks at home or abroad by recognizing Croatia within its internationally recognized borders, as this is the condition for having the sanctions lifted. If afterwards the local Serbs fail to obey, then Arkan's and Loncar's belligerent desire will materialize. But prior to this local chetniks have to be reminded again that once a top-level agreement has been achieved Milosevic will not have any serious reasons to start an all-out war again because of a handful of disobedient Serbs.

A decision by local Serbs should therefore be expected at the eleventh hour. It is difficult to say what kind it will be; it is likewise difficult to express any hope with regard to its content. Had Croatia based its policy by expressing hope with regard to somebody else's decisions, it would have never approached the resolution of the last of its territorial problems.

Local Serbs Accused of Stalling Negotiations

AU0911100895 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Visnja Staresina: "Agreement 'at the Eleventh Hour'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yet another negotiating attempt with the local Serb authorities from eastern Slavonia has remained without result, which comes as no surprise at all. For it is a traditional rule of political negotiations that the crucial problems (and eastern Slavonia certainly is a crucial problem) are left unsolved until the end, which means either until the end of the Dayton conference or until the very expiry of the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] mandate, at the end of November. If agreement is reached, it will happen only "at the eleventh hour."

Simultaneously, the entity known as the international community has, as ever, different views of the solution.

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The Serbs from eastern Slavonia are much softer in negotiations than one would conclude from the statements they give later on. They understand that the region will fall to Croatia by any agreement, but they do not want it to be seen as their retreat and defeat—one Western diplomat has told us in Geneva. He does not think that the agreement, or peaceful reintegration, is impossible. However, he admits, among the Serbs who live in that area, it is hard to find any who will agree to stay there under Croatian authority. Even if there is an agreement that clearly says it is Croatian territory, if the mixed police comes, as is envisaged, one can expect many Serbs to leave that region, particularly those who feel guilty, including the representatives of the present authorities, according to our interlocutor.

Such a solution, although rather idealized, is not impossible if two conditions are fulfilled: first, if a clear agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem is reached, and second, that the implementation of the agreement is precisely defined and provided for by respectable forces, and not by those hitherto seen around. That is, now that NATO has pulled out as the executor of the agreement, to establish joint international forces capable of carrying the agreement out.

However, there are different views of the solution within the international community itself, which in fact provide an incentive to the Serbs to outmaneuver the negotiations. Last week, at his farewell news conference in Geneva, Yasushi Akashi presented a vision of such a "solution." So, Akashi claims that, due to the new political atmosphere, the present blue helmets in that area, reinforced by three battalions, would be able to disarm the paramilitary units in the transitional period. No comment, except not only have the blue helmets not disarmed Serbian paramilitary units, but Ghali says unperturbedly in his report that some 300 meters from the UN Headquarters in Erdut is Arkan's [Zeljko Raznjatovic] training center.

One could go further. One of the initial commanders of the Russian battalion that has been accommodated in Erdut, Colonel Loginov, became Arkan's instructor after taking off his blue helmet. Is it only neighborliness or is there closer cooperation? Or, even during the negotiations, the negotiators do not know whether they will be able to drive away afterward, because local forces have been stealing even the cars parked in front of the Headquarters. But there is one criterion. They steal only those cars that belong to the Belgian battalion, and they do not touch the Russian ones because "they do not like their models."

Serbs Report Army Firing in E. Slavonia

AU0811190895 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Command of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps has reported that the Croatian Army last night opened rifle grenade and infantry fire towards the positions of the Baranja division of the Serb Army of Krajina in the (?Topolik) area.

Croatian forces also opened fire on the Brijest-Tenjski Antunovac and Nustar-Brsadin areas.

TV Lists More New Ministers

LD0811144295 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivica Kostovic has been reappointed deputy prime minister in charge of humanitarian issues. He was also appointed minister of science and technology.

Dr. Ljerka Mintas Hodak is the new deputy prime minister in charge of internal policy and the social sector. Prior to this appointment she was an adviser to the outgoing prime minister and deputy minister for maritime affairs, transport, and communications.

Davor Stern, a minister without portfolio in Nikica Valentic's government, has been appointed economics minister.

Bozo Biskupic is the new culture minister. He is a keen cultural enthusiast and before joining the government was deputy mayor of Zagreb. He was also an assistant minister of culture and education in 1992.

Ljilja Vokic is the new minister of education and sport.

There are two more new names in Zlatko Matesa's government—Matej Jankovic and Branko Mocibob. Matej Jankovic, former prefect of the Vukovar-Srijem county, is the new minister of agriculture. Branko Mocibob is the only minister without portfolio in the new government. Before this appointment he managed the Rijeka Bank branch in Porec.

HDZ Official Looks Back on Election Results

AU0911105795 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 95 p 12-13

[Interview with Dr. Ivic Pasalic, HDZ vice chairman and presidential advisor for interior policy, by Mate Piskor: "Extremists Cannot Succeed With Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The post-election mood, an analysis of the successes and failures in the elections, personnel changes, and negotiations with the rebel Serbs

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were the topics of our interview with Dr. Ivic Pasalic, HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] vice chairman and presidential advisor for interior policy.

[Piskor] Immediately before these elections, in a conversation you mentioned the desires and expectations of the HDZ in the elections. The elections are behind us; the results are known. Were your expectations satisfied?

[Pasalic] I find the success in the elections, the HDZ's electoral results, very good. It is certainly far better than our political opponents would have liked or expected, but it is in line with our realistic political estimations.

Although many things are known about the election results, it should be clearly stated that the HDZ won the largest support, compared with elections that took place hitherto. Namely, 45.23 percent of the electorate voted for the HDZ state list, which in 1992 won 43.72 percent, and in 1990 42.18 percent of the vote. Further, in 1992 the average success of our candidates in the constituencies was 37 percent, and now it is 44.06 percent. We won in 20 out of 28 constituencies, even though all the major opposition parties were supporting a single candidate against the HDZ candidate. Even in such an unusual contest we beat the opposition. Thus, for instance, of the seven constituencies where the opposition candidate came from the ranks of the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party], the HDZ won six. In nine constituencies the opposition candidate was from the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and the HDZ won seven of these. Furthermore, the 89.99 percent of the votes for the HDZ list from Croatian citizens not residing in the Republic of Croatia gives us additional proof of the support for President Tudjman and the the HDZ.

[Piskor] You were hoping for a two-thirds majority, but you did not get it!

[Pasalic] I knew that you would ask me that question, so allow me to elaborate upon it. In the preparations for these elections and the election campaign, we very clearly showed that our objective was a convincing victory, a qualified majority in parliament, because a qualified majority makes it possible to make decisions with a parliamentary majority without needing any votes from the opposition. That was our objective—to see to it that parliament is of good quality and stable and that the policy of the majority party is not questioned. The two-thirds majority was not our priority, but given that the story was circulating that our goal was to win a two-thirds majority, it would have been a mistake in a propaganda sense to have said that we did not want or could not win a two-thirds majority. We said that we wanted a majority and, if we won a two-thirds majority, our victory would taste even sweeter. The point is that the opposition parties were very skillful in spreading the story that our goal was a two-thirds majority, so that we could change the Constitution.

[Piskor] So that you could create a Banovina [country ruled by a prince] and suchlike?

[Pasalic] Those statements are ridiculous and groundless. As I say, they were primarily used to create a public climate that would encourage voting against the HDZ candidates and state list. They may have partially succeeded in this, but not significantly, because the HDZ won more than 60 percent of the seats in parliament and more than in the previous elections.

[Piskor] It has been said that the great benefit of these elections was to clean up the Croatian political scene and that the political powers within parliament and outside it will be better shaped so that they can be distinguished. What is it about?

[Pasalic] Our party leadership and President Tudjman have pointed out on several occasions that our objective was, both through the electoral legislature and in overall policy, to shapef a better and more recognizable political party scene in Croatia. That means that the HDZ is clearly positioned as a popular center party, which we are, and that there is also a left-wing party, a right-wing party, a clearly recognizable social- democratic option, and that the total of over 80 registered and more than 60 active parties is reduced to a number more appropriate to the size of our electorate and our country. It is obvious that the processes have also been moving in this direction.

The election results appear to indicate that there is a right-wing party because the HSP [Croatian Party of Right] passed the election threshold; that there is a strong social democratic party, which was a surprise for some people but not for us; and that, naturally, there are the liberals and the HSS as the more significant political parties in Croatia.

[Piskor] And there are strong regional parties.

[Pasalic] One should be clear and fair and admit that IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress] achieved a major victory in the 8th and 21st constituencies.

[Piskor] Many people say that IDS in Istria is the same thing as the HDZ in Croatia.

[Pasalic] That is the political reality, although we, of course, are not glad that they won the elections in their own region so convincingly. The elections were fair and honest and in such elections they won the confidence of the majority.

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[Piskor] The liberals won fewer votes than they had before. Was that a surprise for you?

[Pasalic] No, it was not. We expected that the liberals would win that much or a bit less than that and in the next elections 7-8 percent of the vote.

[Piskor] However, you were surprised at the excellent election result of the HSS-IDS-HNS [Croatian Peasants Party-Istrian Democratic Congress-Croatian National Party] coalition?

[Pasalic] To be frank, I had expected that they would win fewer votes, about 15 percent or even fewer than that, but they won over 18 percent. When we analyze this coalition, it is certain that the HSS, the party that was supposed to and did produce most of the votes, has lost the confidence of the electorate. It got fewer votes in this election than it had previously won independently. In the constituencies, in a direct contest with our candidates, the HSS, although supported by the whole opposition, lost six out of seven constituencies. As I speak about it, I will tell you an important message from these elections. Coalitions nevertheless attract a certain part of the electorate and one should count on that in the next elections.

[Piskor] Has the Croatian electorate, the Croatian citizens, once again shown in these elections that they do not like extremists?

[Pasalic] These elections, like all previous ones, are proof of the maturity of the electorate in Croatia and proof that the Croats are an intelligent political nation, structured better than some European nations and with a far longer tradition of parliamentary democracy. Namely, the extremists did not succeed in any elections with us, and the majority of the electorate concentrated around the centrist political programs. Even at the time of the fiercest aggression on Croatia, when the wounds of war were exceptionally severe and fresh, the electorate did not accept extremist solutions, which is the best answer to those who would like to associate epithets like extreme nationalism, fascism, and others, with the Croatian state and people. Remember how many votes the fascist and neonazi parties have won in some Western countries.

[Piskor] Simultaneously with the elections for the Chamber of Representatives in parliament, elections for the county, that is, the city assembly, and municipal councils were held in Zagreb. It was a pretty bitter pill for the HDZ. Why was there such a noticeable electoral decline for the HDZ in Zagreb?

[Pasalic] It is not simple to talk about the structure of the electorate in towns in an interview for a newspaper, but it is obvious that it is separate in relation to the overall electorate in Croatia.

[Piskor] What do you mean by separate? Is it because they did not vote for the HDZ?

[Pasalic] The structure of the electorate in large towns, particularly Zagreb, owing to its social, cultural, economic, and other reasons, is somewhat different from the majority of the electorate, and the motives for the decisions of voters in towns are also different than when one makes a decision at state level. Let me explain. At the state level, the priorities are the reliability of the authority that will watch out for the national interests, a stable, recognizable democratic authority, and on the level of the local centers, particularly big towns and the city of Zagreb, people appreciate the authority principally on the basis of what the authority does to improve the quality of life in those towns. Besides, the structure of the urban population is much more complex than at the outskirts of towns because people who live in towns live a harder and poorer life than in the countryside and in the outskirts, the majority of unemployed are in towns, the majority of subtenants, etc.

[Piskor] Everything that you have just said, you knew before the elections. Could you not have turned your activity, your campaign, in that direction?

[Pasalic] We did know all this, but I have to admit. Our priority was the parliamentary elections and we thought that things would automatically work out in Zagreb, too. In our party there was a separate group of people who dealt with the elections in Zagreb, but, I must admit, in our overall activities, including our campaining activities, it was not our top priority.

Regardless of all this, one should take a look at the figures and the structure of the City Assembly. In it, the HDZ has 17 representatives, which is a relative majority, and this means that as a party we won the confidence of the majority of the Zagreb electorate.

[Piskor] But you do not have a majority vote, which, if the opposition unites, could mean that the mayor of Zagreb will not be from the HDZ?

[Pasalic] I have already said that we have got a relative majority of city councillors and with 17 seats we are the only party that can achieve a majority vote in the City Assembly by entering into a coalition with other parties or a party. Therefore I may conclude that the HDZ won in Zagreb, too, as some 36 percent of the citizens of Zagreb voted for our list, although we had poorer showings in individual wards. The reasons for that should be sought in everything that I was talking about a moment ago, and probably also in the bad estimation of candidates whom we put up for the wards.

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[Piskor] You still have not answered who the mayor of Zagreb will be and that is the most interesting issue, not only in the capital, but also in all of Croatia.

[Pasalic] It is hard to talk about names at the moment, but I believe that it will be an HDZ member.

[Piskor] Both before and after the elections, there were many different comments provoked by the special list for Croatian citizens who do not live in Croatia and for emigres. How would you defend your party's decision?

[Pasalic] I will be as very clear as the HDZ is in interpreting its political stands. This election law reflects our political program and we consistently carry out our program. So, by enabling all Croats to vote, wherever they are, we are fulfilling our constitutional obligation, as well as our policy principle: the union of the homeland and emigre Croatia, the union of the totality of the Croatian body, equally in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Canada, in Germany and Australia, in America and New Zealand, wherever one can find a Croat. We wanted to structure the Croatian parliament in line with that policy decision, hence the special lists.

I would like to say something else. Now that the Croatian state has been created, our present priorities are to liberate it, affirm it, and strengthen its potential in every respect, from economy to demography, and to preserve Croathood in the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina so that the Croats as a constituent nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina exercise all their rights, also because of the strategic interests of the Croatian state. It is well known how much misunderstanding there was regarding both emigres and the policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did not invite emigres to return primarily for their money but because of their knowledge and skills and because of the need for demographic revival. Because, as long as there are Croats, there will be Croatia and emigres will play an important role in it.

In our party, in the opposition parties, and in our governments so far, there has been a lack of understanding for emigres and bureaucratic obstacles to their return.

[Piskor] It is in Croatia's interest for the emigres to return, but is it perhaps not the same in the case of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Pasalic] Of course not, as their place is where they live, but the whole Croatian body must see to it that they are equal, that they are a constituent nation, which is, on the other hand, a crucial strategic interest of the Republic of Croatia. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not part of the Croatian diaspora, they are an inseparable part of the Croatian body; and had it not been for the help from Croatia, there would be no Bosnia-Herzegovina any longer, it would be annexed to Serbia, and then there would not be one Croat there. And without a just solution for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia is also endangered. Many parties in Croatia do not understand this and we think that the best thing is for the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats in parliament to explain that policy and those interests.

[Piskor] Crucial objections to the election of parliamentary representatives by emigres are that taxes and other issues will be decided upon by people who do not live in Croatia and on whom those decisions of parliament will have no effect. Is that objection logical?

[Pasalic] The presence of representatives of emigre Croats in the Croatian parliament will, according to our political estimates, be one of the best ways to remove the barriers for the return of the emigres. As for your question, the majority of the emigres' representatives live in Croatia, that is, they are emigres who have returned to the homeland over the last five years and have been sharing both good and bad with us. So, they will be deciding about things that most directly involve them. Once again I have to emphasize that there is a relatively small number of us Croats and we should not work strictly as a party but in every way possible stimulate and develop the unity of the Croatian nation.

[Piskor] You mentioned that one of the primary tasks was the liberation of the occupied territories. You have been involved in negotiations with the rebel Serbs. The negotiations are now stalled. What is going to happen?

[Pasalic] The Croatian position is clear. Eastern Slavonia, western Srijem, and Baranja, are parts of the Republic of Croatia in which the Serbs have never been a majority nation. There are no negotiations about that. Croatia offers them all civic and national rights, elections, local government and self-government, reconstruction, and development. The question is only whether those messages reach them or are blocked by the leaders of the rebel Serbs, who know that their time is running out, regardless of the way reintegration occurs. I am sure that if there were elections there Croatian citizens of Serb nationality would not vote for them.

[Piskor] The Serb negotiators have impudently refused the proposal for integration put together by Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Stoltenberg. Will this help to expose the world campaign to portray Croatia as responsible for the standstill in the negotiations?

[Pasalic] Whenever they estimate in the world that Croatia is strong, that its negotiating position is better, the result is usually pressure in the media, statements by politicians, various resolutions.

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[Piskor] One question can be heard: "Why does Tudjman care so much about that tiny chunk of land?"

[Pasalic] All right, but it is precisely that question that reveals all the hypocrisy of those who ask it. It is part of Croatia and therefore Tudjman cares as much about it as much as every citizen or politician of any country in the world cares about the parts of their own homeland. What would be the reaction of the Germans or the Italians or the Americans if anybody occupied part of their territory? They would certainly be less patient than Croatia.

[Piskor] How far will this patience stretch?

[Pasalic] We have said that on many occasions. The pressure of the Croats displaced from that area has been growing bigger and bigger and those people have the right to demand from the Croatian authorities to provide the conditions for their return home. Therefore we have said—the expiry of the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] mandate is the deadline by which the agreement on peaceful integration must be reached. Afterward, President Tudjman and the Croatian leadership will decide new moves and other solutions. We will not allow this to drag on and we will not give in to pressures from whomever to postpone the question of reintegrating the occupied parts of Croatia for some other time.

[Box 1, p 12]

No Major Changes in the Government

[Piskor] The elections are over and soon the new administration will start functioning. What will the priorities be?

[Pasalic] They have already been defined earlier. First, the liberation of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, then the return of the displaced, reconstruction, building, improved living standards, care for the retired, and the unmasking of all forms of abuse and crime. That is written in our program and we will carry it out to the very end?

[Piskor] With a new team in the government?

[Pasalic] There will be no major changes; there is no need for them, because the government has been doing fine and we are not at the beginning, so we do not have to check the ability of the people. It is well known what can be done so that everybody gets the position that he deserves.

[Box 2, p 13]

Interest and Post-Election Coalitions

[Piskor] Who provides the mandate for the new city government?

[Pasalic] The majority in the City Assembly. I know what you mean here; The HDZ does not have a majority. It does not have an absolute majority, but it does have a relative majority. It is logical then that the party with the majority wins the mandate to appoint the city mayor and the city government, together with a coalition partner to help it get majority support in the City Assembly of Zagreb. We have to know that there are no dogmas in politics and, if anything is relative in life, it is political alliances. I particularly refer to post-election coalitions, which will primarily be determined by interests. And everybody understands that the HDZ, as the ruling party in the country, is by far the strongest partner at every local level. Besides, in all developed democracies it is normal for the party that has the majority, be it even a relative majority, to have priority in demanding and offering coalition partners.

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Article Considers Possible Gligorov Successors

AU0811200595 London WARREPORT in English Oct 95 p 17

[Report by Kim Mehmeti in Skopje for the Alternative Information Network: "Who Will Succeed Gligorov? Uncertainty Rules Macedonia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] [Passage omitted] No one knows for sure how many people are already putting the sign which reads "In memoriam" underneath the picture of their President who, as the physicians claim, is successfully enduring frequent surgeries, or how many are saying "The traitor Gligorov is dead", manifesting in this way not only their attitude towards the President himself, but also their stance towards his policy. Nor does anyone know whether the photo-robot made by German experts will be of any help in locating one of the assassins who is said to have bought an "Ami 8" nine days before the attempt, which was filled with explosives and activated in broad daylight in the street through which the President passed every day on his way to the office.

And while foreign and local physicians are struggling to save the seriously wounded Gligorov, almost everyone agrees that even if the President survives, he is off the political scene for good. This is a good enough reason to trigger off speculations about the future President of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Names most frequently mentioned are those of Stojan Andov (the current Chairman of the Assembly of Macedonia and, pursuant to the Constitution, the temporary President of the state) and Vasil Tupurkovski (member of the last former presidency of former Yugoslavia). If one believed rumours, one could reach the conclusion that several other people who consider themselves worthy substitutes for Gligorov, have already begun preparations to start in the race for the office of the President, but if one wished to be realistic, one would know that only Andov and Tupurkovski can count on the major support of the citizens. This does not mean that there may not be surprises made by opposition parties VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party. While it is claimed with certainty that Andov will run for president, the only thing that is stressed concerning Vasil Tupurkovski, even by rumours is restraint. He would actually be the only real opponent to the "greedy" Andov, and according to the assessments of some analysts, maybe even the best man for Macedonia at this moment.

Whether Andov and Tupurkovski are the only candidates in the possible presidential elections, is a question that cannot be answered in the affirmative yet. Especially when there is speculations that Branko Crvenskovski, Prime Minister and the leader of the most powerful Macedonian political party at the moment—the Social Democratic Alliance—is under pressure from a few of his party colleagues who have ambitions to try their luck at presidential elections. Most frequently the names of the current Minister of Defence, Hansinski, and that of Vice-Chairman of the republican parliament, Tito Petkovski, are mentioned in this context. [passage omitted]

EU States Agree To Recognize 'Green Cards'

AU0911093195 Skopje MIC in English 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The coordinated activities of the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, its foreign diplomatic missions, the diplomatic missions of Great Britain, France and Italy in Skopje, as well as the insurance company "Makedonija," have all contributed to the signing of the unified agreement by all EU member-states on November 7. Over the past couple of days, this agreement was signed by France, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain and finally Portugal, which means that the green card issued by the National Bureau for Green Cards of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] will be recognized in all EU member-states.

The Interior Ministry announces that efforts are continuing to determine, as soon as possible, the date from which the validity of the green cards will start.

LP Favors Rehabilitation of Victims of 1945

95BA0356A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 5 Sep 95 p 4

[Article by Z. Petrov: "Sorry 'Rehabilitation'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In practical terms, the latest initiative of the Liberals is an extension of their rehabilitation promise voiced at the summit party meeting two and a half months ago.*

The declaration issued last week by a group of Liberal Party [LP] representatives was submitted to the Assembly of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] for discussion at one of the forthcoming sessions. It triggered extensive public interest. Many issues relative to the reasons and objectives of this declaration arise not only because the document calls for the individual rehabilitation of repressed citizens and their families during the period from the end of the war to the first multiparty elections, but also because the draft declaration is signed only by some of the Liberal representatives and not by the entire group.

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The draft declaration consists of four items, the first of which applies to the Macedonian Assembly that, as the agency of the state and on its behalf, expresses regret and apologizes to the citizens and the members of their families who, from 1945 to 1990 were victims of an injustice, involving acts of criminal persecution and other types of repression, who were sentenced groundlessly or without proof, and in violation of the most basic rules of the law. The second item of this document calls for the Assembly to draft laws and other legal stipulations for recognizing individual cases of unjustly repressed citizens and to provide conditions for the proper satisfaction for the wrongdoings. For that reason, the declaration demands (in the third item) evidence based on documents kept by the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] for that period to be available to the repressed citizens and their families, the Ministry of Justice, the public prosecutor, and the courts. The last item in the LP draft calls for opening files of the Communist Party of Macedonia, subsequently renamed the SKM [League of Communists of Macedonia] as a necessary prerequisite for shedding light on the named cases.

A similar initiative was submitted by the LP at its 24 June 1995 meeting. More specifically, the introductory speech by Stojan Andov, the LP leader, expressed the need for a rational and just attitude on the part of the state concerning cases of unjust acts affecting the citizens. Andov voiced the possibility of an eventual formulation of a government statement on this subject, as a result of which the state would encourage a more favorable climate or, as he said then, "this would make it possible for the state to apologize to unfairly repressed citizens by the state authorities and on behalf of the state." The result was last week's draft declaration submitted for parliamentary discussion.

It is of interest to note that in connection with this subject several subsequent events took place. Among others, the updating of this promise was initiated also on the highest level of the state—by the president. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism, President Gligorov, in saying that after 50 years since the last war, the time has come for all the dead to rest in peace, with honor, as lost human lives, regardless of which side they were on. He then said that, to this effect, "we must do everything possible to find the graves of those who died, although they fought for the other side, so that their descendants and relatives may express their reverence and may care for their eternal homes." This statement by the president is embodied in one of the still unfinished steps taken by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice to open the mass grave of 52 Veles people who were executed in January of 1945. Therefore, this was a specific case in which the state assumed a "civilized commitment" to find the graves of those who, considering the circumstances, it treated as its enemies. This obviously is not an act of rehabilitation but merely a first step toward it.

If we look back to the past, we shall remember the fierce debates within the representative authority of the citizens, established after the first multiparty elections when, as proposed by the representatives of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the independent representative Todor Petrov, discussions continued of the proposed laws on the rehabilitation of individuals who had been persecuted or sentenced for the ideas of the VMRO after the war. At that time, the motions submitted by the VMRO-DPMNE and former representative Petrov were rejected by the Assembly. However, with some variations and on a number of occasions, the topic of "rehabilitation or national reconciliation" could be found in individual statements by party representatives or in media articles.

As to the latest initiative of the LP concerning the rehabilitation, that party has taken one more step toward individual rehabilitation as the only possible and reliable way of correcting the injustices. In turn, this would be a guarantee that they would never be repeated in the country.

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Oleksy on Poland's Election to UN Security Council

LD0811193695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1834 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 Nov (PAP)—Commenting on Poland's election as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy told PAP today that this was proof of recognition of Poland's role and position in the international community, as well as recognition of transformations in Poland and the way the country is building its new political system.

Expressing his satisfaction with Wednesday's vote in the United Nations, Oleksy noted that this was also an expression of recognition of dynamism of the Polish economy and transformations that are "highly appreciated and clearly seen" by other countries.

"This confirms that transformations in Poland are on the right track and that Poland is an important country that can share its experiences with other regional states," Oleksy said.

He pointed out that, thanks to Poland's election to the Security Council, "our presence in important international affairs will be intensified." According to the prime minister, Poland will be able to achieve a better knowledge of world politics and remain in touch with countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Defense Minister Signs Accord With Austria

AU0811145095 Paris AFP in English 1425 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, Nov 8 (AFP)—Austria and Poland signed an agreement on military cooperation here Wednesday [8 November] including military training and scientific and technological research.

The accord was signed by defense ministers Zbigniew Okonski of Poland and Austria's Werner Fasslabend.

Poland has shown interest in making an Austrian armored troops transport vehicle under license, while Austria plans to buy the Polish Sokol helicopter.

Okonski said that Austrian experts would come to Poland soon to test the Sokol.

Walesa Addresses Freedom Union, Outlines Program

LD0811152695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 8 Nov 95

[Report from the Polish Sejm by correspondent Krzysztof Grzesiowski]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Right now Lech Walesa, president of the Polish Republic, is entering Room 118, accompanied by Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, chairman of the Freedom Union [UW], and Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the UW parliamentary floor group. The meeting with UW deputies and senators, as well as with the invited guests, which was called yesterday, will start shortly. [passage omitted]

[Walesa] [Passage omitted] Ladies and gentlemen! In the second term in office, I want to continue implementing the August [1980] plans because I have always treated my presidency as a service to Polish reforms. However, I am aware that the new circumstances, as well as challenges emerging all the time, require that we should act in a new and more effective team style.

As I have already announced, apart from the new constitution, I think that the most urgent tasks are: to turn all state offices into offices that belong to all of the citizens; to increase the role of local government; to increase the effectiveness of the courts; to carry out speedy and broad privatization; to establish lower and stable taxes; to reduce the cost of the social security system; to improve the standard of education; to improve the living standards of pensioners and families with many children; to enter NATO and the EU; and to improve the significance of moral standards in public life.

The present constitution does not provide the president with many powers, so I shall mainly take advantage of my legislative possibilities and initiate and support projects that will facilitate the fulfillment of these objectives. I shall also veto those bills that contradict these objectives.

I shall listen to the opinions of appropriate experts and competent people of various professions. I am asking you, ladies and gentlemen, to support this program and to cooperate in its implementation.

Thank you for your attention and thank you for this meeting. [applause] [passage omitted]

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Walesa Denies Knowing Alleged Campaign Organizer

LD0811145095 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Lech Walesa said that he is not acquainted with anyone called Andrzej Pastwa, who, according to the NIE weekly and the TRYBUNA daily, was supposed to be an organizer of his election campaign and who received a car and communications equipment from the former Warsaw police chief. Lech Walesa stressed that Pastwa is a crook. He added that three weeks ago the Presidential Chancellery approached law enforcement agents, asking them to begin proceedings in this matter.

Investigation To Be Conducted

LD0811173795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw Chief Police Commander Arnold Superczynski resigned yesterday. The resignation is connected with the fact that Superczynski made available police equipment to Andrzej Pastwa, chairman of the National Public Electoral Committee for Lech Walesa's presidency. Yesterday's TRYBUNA reported, quoting the NIE weekly, that Andrzej Pastwa has a 15-year prison sentence on his record.

Ryszard Kucinski, press spokesman for the Warsaw prosecutor's office, says that the Warsaw prosecutor has started an investigation against Andrzej Pastwa.

[Begin Kucinski recording] The Warsaw prosecutor's office has taken over the investigation in this matter and today decided to start an investigation into the suspected crime, in accordance with Article 205 of the Penal Code—that is, into a crime involving fraud. [end recording]

Criminal Past of Accused Revealed

WS0911084195

[FBIS Editorial Report] The 9 November NIE, a Warsaw vernacular weekly edited by Jerzy Urban, former spokesman of the communist government, carries a 2,000-word report by Marek Baranski on pages 1 and 2 entitled "The Murky Secrets of the Presidential Chancellery; Walesa's Henchmen."

The report claims that the head of Lech Walesa's National Civic Campaign Staff, Andrzej Pastwa, is a "professional swindler" who spent 15 years in prison. He served his last 10-year sentence in Siedlce, where his jail supervisor was Ryszard Superczynski, the brother of Warsaw Police Chief Arnold Superczynski. The latter became widely known when he publicly announced that he and not former head of the Presidential Chancellery Mieczyslaw Wachowski, as Center Accord chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski alleged, was in a picture taken at a training course for the Security Service [SB]. Kaczynski considered the picture to be sufficient to charge Wachowski of collaboration with the SB. Tomasz Kwiatkowski, former head of the Presidential Chancellery, confirmed to NIE that Pastwa was involved in Lech Walesa's election campaign. He was recommended by Arnold Superczynski and Mieczyslaw Wachowski for the job. NIE writes: "Pastwa was credible because the car he traveled in throughout Poland organizing Walesa's campaign was furnished by Warsaw Police Chief Arnold Superczynski with police equipment." That equipment consisted of a radio system and flashing signal lights. Superczynski did not deny that he knows Pastwa but claims he was not aware of his criminal past.

NIE adds: "After the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], this is further documented proof that the apolitical MSW is in fact on Walesa's side. We will not be satisfied by assurances that services subordinated to the interior minister have nothing to do with this. Kwasniewski campaign staff head Waniek and Kwasniewski campaign staffer Siemiatkowski said that the Office of State Protection was involved in a campaign against Kwasniewski and that we have reasons to believe them." The weekly quotes Andrzej Pastwa as saying that, apart from signatures of support, he collected money to finance Walesa's campaign. "He stated that he handed over all of the money to the head of the president's campaign staff, Deputy Gwizdz. He received money from various businessmen, whose names he revealed to us. He claims that he gave them receipts for the donations, but handed the money to Gwizdz without any receipts. Pastwa is enraged by the fact that, in the past few days, Deputy Gwizdz not only denied receiving the money, but also ordered him to give it back. We are most probably talking about the sum of 1 billion old zlotys. 'Where am I supposed to get it from, now that I have handed it all over?' he asks."

Jerzy Gwizdz told the NIE reporter that he has "nothing to do with any Pastwas," that he "never received any money from Mr. Pastwa," and that, "apart from an account at Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy, Lech Walesa's campaign staff does not have any money deposited elsewhere." The author concludes that Andrzej Pastwa, "a professional criminal who has connections with the police," may become a minister of state in the near future. Xerox copies of three documents accompany the report: One certifies that Andrzej Pastwa opened an account at Powszechny Bank Kredytowy, the second carries a sample of his signature, and the third confirms that 20,000

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old zlotys were transferred from a company named Multico to Andrzej Pastwa at Lech Walesa's National Campaign Staff.

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish on 7 November carries a front-page summary of the NIE report, signed by "AFRY," under the title: "NIE's Revelations; A Criminal Is Promoting Walesa."

Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish on 8 November carries a 650-word report by "KNYSZ" and "JACH" on the front page, entitled "The Chief's Resignation," stating that Warsaw Police Chief Arnold Superczynski handed in his resignation on 7 November following the NIE and TRYBUNA publications. The report quotes the head of Lech Walesa's campaign staff as saying: "There is no such thing as the Lech Walesa National Civic Campaign Staff. There is only the campaign staff I myself head and the Campaign Committee headed by Jerzy Stepien." GAZETA WYBORCZA discredits the copies of documents published by NIE, claiming that they show only "that Andrzej P. opened an account at Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA. It does not prove that he was an authorized representative of the president, the head of the campaign staff, or the Campaign Committee." The report states that Gwizdz said he does not know Pastwa and that he had informed the prosecutor's office that a crime had been committed. He deemed the NIE report "sheer provocation."

A note released by the Warsaw Presidential Press Office Information Service in Polish on 7 November states: "In connection with the TRYBUNA report on the activities of Andrzej P., the Presidential Press Office wishes to inform that, on 30 October, the head of the Presidential Chancellery, Stanislaw Iwanicki, informed the police that there are grounds to suspect that a series of frauds have been committed. A report submitted to the Presidential Chancellery indicates that the case was handed over to the Voivodship chief of police in Ostroleka."

UOP Chief: Services Not Involved in Campaign

LD0811162495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the State Protection Office [UOP], stated that the special services have not been and are not involved in the presidential campaign. Gromoslaw Czempinski made this statement at a meeting of the Sejm Commission for Special Services. As a result of the motion by Deputy Zbigniew Siemiatkowski of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], the commission is discussing the possible involvement of the secret services in the election campaign.

Walesa Chief Lists Complaints Against Kwasniewski

LD0811212895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2012 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 Nov—According to Jerzy Gwizdz, head of President Lech Walesa's election headquarters, an insurmountable past, an imbalance of power in Poland, the triumph of moral nihilism, and an economic oligarchy are the four reasons Aleksander Kwasniewski should not become president. Gwizdz met with journalists this afternoon in Warsaw.

In Gwizdz's opinion, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader had a number of opportunities to settle accounts with the past but failed to do so. "He forgot that, were it not for Lech Walesa, he would not be running for the presidency in a free Poland but, rather, would be a Central Committee lackey," he said.

The head of Walesa's electoral headquarters said that the SLD leader's election victory would mean that legislative, judiciary, and executive powers would be taken over by representatives of one political option—the left.

"The figure of Kwasniewski clearly displays the triumph of moral nihilism and the struggle against national traditions," Gwizdz said and added that the SLD leader's support consisted of "faithful readers of the NIE, which is compromising enough...."

Gwizdz described the scandal connected with the shares of the Polisa Insurance and Reinsurance Association, some of which had been purchased by wives of the prime minister and the SLD head, as "only the tip of the iceberg" and proof that there were links between business and government-and-party structures.

"It is not suitable for the Polish Republic to have a president like Kwasniewski," Gwizdz told the assembled journalists and assured them that Walesa intends to conduct a positive campaign, but that, if attacks by Kwasniewski's camp happen again, his election headquarters will take appropriate steps.

Kwasniewski Views Platform, Election Results

WS0911080095 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 11 Nov 95 p 16

["Exclusive" commentary by Presidential Candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski: "A Debate Is Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] My predictions have proved to be correct, and the results of the first round are even better than I supposed they would be. It is quite clear that the people have become more mature. The fact that

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Tyminski [candidate running in previous presidential elections] failed to collect 100,000 signatures of support was not at all accidental. There is no demand for political extremism, for amateurs. The result achieved by Janusz-Korwin Mikke, and even by Jan Olszewski, shows that violent, ideological, anticommunist rhetoric is not in demand. The society is turning toward well-known politicians and proven platforms.

I was one of the few who believed that Lech Walesa would get to the runoff. Apart from being a symbol, he is a person who has been a very active participant in public life over the past five years; he has talents that he is able to take advantage of, especially in direct contacts. Finally, this man won the elections in 1990 and, even though he disappointed many people, to a certain part of the people he still personifies the symbol of hope; to them he is still the one who guarantees the feeling that the transformations on which the country embarked in 1989 make sense.

I am glad that the thesis that our electorate is dying out has proved false. In fact, this could be seen as early as 1993. The thesis that our electorate cannot be more numerous than 25 percent has also proved untrue. I have obtained 35 percent already. I am particularly satisfied with the fact that support for me increased in the following three social groups: among young people; in the countryside, where my ratings have so far been lower; and, finally, among women.

The campaign was very uneven; however, it had to be that way because there were 17 candidates. The quality of some of them was close to misunderstanding or even to a scandal. As a consequence of the fact that there were so many candidates, discussion of important substantive subjects was very difficult. The only debate that made for discussion of substantive issues was the one organized by POLITYKA early in the campaign. Then things were much worse. I also believe that opinions issued by the media mostly differed from social preferences. For a long time one could get the impression that there was only one strong candidate, who is not valued very highly, Lech Walesa, and a second candidate, who is not popular with the people, Aleksander Kwasniewski. Today when [Chief Editor] Adam Michnik is saying that GAZETA WYBORCZA did not wage a campaign, he is making me roll with laughter.

I was often asked about the fundamental differences between my vision of the state and that proposed by Lech Walesa. I dare say that such a debate on platforms is indispensable. It is the candidates' duty to explain to the people what they will do over the five-year term. The president has concrete work to do over these five years. It is work on which he signs some kind of a contract with his voters. Here is how I see the conditions of my contract. In Poland there is no need to carry out a revolution or to make radical turnarounds. These elections showed this, and I believe that Lech Walesa agrees with me on that. I am saying this because we can hear opinions that Poland needs changes. May I ask what kind of changes? If the person elected to the second round is a candidate linked to the present governing coalition, and if his countercandidate is the incumbent president, what changes does the society want? I know that this will sound a little deceptive, but let us note that Jacek Kuron, the candidate whose main slogan in the campaign was "Changes are necessary," garnered less than 10 percent of the votes. I see this as yet more proof of the maturity of the people; I believe that this also shows that the reforms started in 1989 are in the right direction. There is no need to seek third, fourth, or 10th roads. Democracy, a free market, openness to the world - hese are the main principles chosen six years ago and still implemented today.

As far as democracy is concerned, the most important thing is the constitution. I believe that the new constitution can be presented to the people as a subject for a referendum in 1996. We may conclude the work in the spring; we can conduct a solid campaign in the society. The presidency of Lech Walesa means that we will have a new constitution in the year 2000. Supporting the Solidarity draft entails the necessity of altering, by law, the procedure of working on the new basic law. This would probably have to be done by a new parliament.

There are issues on which we differ quite fundamentally that must be resolved. The first is the position of the president. I am a supporter of a presidency that would not differ much from the current model. Lech Walesa is talking about a presidential system. The second issue is the relations between the state and the church. I believe that they should be similar to the draft regulation submitted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Walesa, so far at least, has been opting for solutions that would guarantee the church a privileged position. Now, as far as the issue of dissolving the parliament is concerned, I think that this parliament should be maintained—if, of course, it is interested in this itself. What I have in mind is not my own influence in it. If I win the elections, I do not need to be afraid of the results of parliamentary elections. I do believe, however, that, unless we finally work for the entire four-year term, we will not teach responsibility either to us or to the people in power. Aside from that, if this parliament continues to work, I will cooperate with it for two years because I will have neither political nor moral reasons to come into conflict with it. As I see it, Lech Walesa will aim to dissolve

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the Sejm. We would spend the year 1996 discussing how it could be dissolved, when the constitution should be passed, which events should precede others. Thus, where implementation of reforms is concerned, it would be largely a lost year.

Meanwhile, the task of paramount importance is to maintain economic growth. This frequently requires unpopular decisions, and first and foremost it requires cooperation between the president and the parliament. Without this cooperation implementation of reforms of the social and health insurance system will not be possible. My presidency would mean that in 1996 these two problems would be resolved. The year 1996 is the only time possible because a year later, in 1997, we will have parliamentary elections, and political parties will be less inclined to deal with such difficult issues.

The year 1996 must also be used for the purpose of decentralizing powers, which would include reorganization of the economic center and a reform of the administrative center. It must also be used to start a discussion on two-level territorial self-governments. We will not be able to put all of this into effect without the harmonious cooperation between the president and the parliament, or without broad political agreement.

Even though there are attempts to scare people with the Belarusian option, there are no great differences between Lech Walesa and me in the area of the foreign policy. I was and am definitely in favor of the EU and NATO. On the other hand, it is necessary to seek agreement with Russia, which requires not only a lot of patience but also great determination. I believe that we must take advantage of the good political climate in the world, and I am convinced that my election will not spoil this climate in any way. I am not an unknown politician in the world. I even believe that, if I am elected president, I will be able to do more to realize these goals than Lech Walesa. He is largely a specialist in declarations, not in laborious tasks that must be carried out.

Aside from programmatic elements, another difference between Lech Walesa and me is the style of playing politics. Lech Walesa is a symbol politician and a politician of symbols. I am a pragmatist. If I am president, there will be more cooperation, joint action, participation in projects when they are being prepared; there will also be fewer spectacular actions. There will be more actions proving that social life can be organized in a better way.

Warsaw Radio Interview With Kwasniewski

LD0811135495 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0715 GMT 8 Nov 95

[Studio interview with presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), by announcer Krzysztof Skowronski; date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Skowronski] Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski is Radio Zet's guest this morning. Good morning.

[Kwasniewski] Good morning.

[Skowronski] Are you going to vote for Lech Walesa?

[Kwasniewski] No.

[Skowronski] Why?

[Kwasniewski] Because there is a better candidate.

[Skowronski] You?

[Kwasniewski] Well, I think any second candidate to Lech Walesa would be better.

[Skowronski] What are your trump cards?

[Kwasniewski] I think that these are a program, public confidence, so clearly demonstrated in the first round, and a political style that differs considerably from that of Lech Walesa. I am a man of joint actions and cooperation.

[Skowronski] How would you describe Lech Walesa's political style?

[Kwasniewski] He is a great tactician, a man who proves himself in struggles and conflicts but who is lacking both ideas and consistency to create long-term strategies. He has had great historical success. Here I am talking about his achievements as the leader of Solidarity. But there exists a considerable difference between revolution and normal work. As far as normal work is concerned, I think Lech Walesa has not had any ideas as regards, for example, the constitution, legal order, or social policy.

[Skowronski] You maintain that you are capable of uniting people and bringing reconciliation on the political scene. But this is impossible. After all, you know that there is a very strong camp of your opponents.

[Kwasniewski] I think every politician has supporters and opponents. But they should be opponents not enemies, and contacts should be maintained. Of course, I have opponents, as does Lech Walesa. But what I propose is: Let us differ, let us have different opinions on specific issues, but, when it comes to action, let us

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work together. That is why my slogan for the second round of the elections is "Common Poland," and this expresses my philosophy.

We have to remember that, if we want to maintain economic development in Poland, to create a democratic order, to strengthen the law, to adopt a constitution, and to reform social insurance, we have to act together. This has to mean cooperation between the president, the government, and parliament, not arguments and fights; this also has to mean cooperation between the president and the widest possible section of society, going far beyond those who had voted for him.

[Skowronski] If you are elected, what do you think the first decisions by the Solidarity National Commission are going to be?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know because I am not a member of the National Commission. One thing is certain, though. If the National Commission is to claim that democratic election results give reason for demonstrations, it would mean that this is a structure that does not understand democracy. I appreciate that there are many reasons for concern in Poland, such as the economic situation of some sections of society and enterprises, unemployment, and so on. But there is no reason whatsoever, and it cannot be tolerated in any democratic state that demonstrations be organized because of a democratic election result. Every loser will then be able to protest and demonstrate. But this means breaking the rules of democracy, the rules of the elections, and the rules of political logic.

[Skowronski] What will you do if Lech Walesa wins?

[Kwasniewski] I will congratulate him.

[Skowronski] And what will Lech Walesa do if he wins?

[Kwasniewski] I believe that he will behave like a democrat, too, because, in spite of his various statements, I believe him to be a man who would not want to lose anything that has been achieved in Poland up to 1995.

[Skowronski] And what will you do if you win?

[Kwasniewski] As I said, I will congratulate...

[Skowronski] [interrupting] Yourself?

[Kwasniewski] I will congratulate the electorate, and, at the same time, I will ask those who did not vote for me to act together because there are some tasks of the utmost importance ahead. I consider the new constitution the most important task for 1996.

[Skowronski] Are there going to be concrete decisions as well? For example, will the heads of the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries be replaced? Will you make such decisions?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, but suggestions concerning personnel matters come from the prime minister. They are cabinet members and the president...

[Skowronski] [interrupting] Are you going to cooperate with the prime minister?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, I think the time will come for an assessment of these and other ministers' activities. Should the prime minister suggest a wider cabinet reshuffle, I think one has to listen to arguments and not oppose outright.

Generally, I am opposed to so-called presidential ministries. If I want to be an efficient president, I should look after one presidential minister, not one of the three just mentioned. This is a finance minister, who should be an apple in the eye of the president, the government, and parliament. As far as the three presidential ministers are concerned, I think there should be no different ministers in a future constitution, but there should be one cabinet as a whole. The prime minister and the entire government should become the president's partners. But as long as the present legislation exists, I would like these matters to be dealt with at the prime minister's initiative, and I will do everything to see that the government is able to act effectively. The more so because my present assessment of these ministers is different and my opinion on them varies.

[Skowronski] Should the government resign if Lech Walesa wins?

[Kwasniewski] There are no reasons for this. This government has important tasks to perform, above all the budget, which has already been submitted to the Sejm. Generally, it would be good if we could separate elections in Poland from budget debates. For some years it has been unfortunate that general and presidential elections have coincided with the period of work on the budget.

[Skowronski] But the political calendar is decided by the politicians?

[Kwasniewski] Yes and no. I think these things happen partly because the politicians have decided so, but partly as coincidence. But this is not the most important issue. The most important thing is that there are no reasons to change the government. Another question concerns the president's position. Is he going to press for the dissolution of parliament? Is he going to act to split the coalition? We will see.

[Skowronski] Why have you not disclosed your financial status?

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[Kwasniewski] I said yesterday that I would like to ask my opponent and myself to do it together. I do not want to be the only person who is scrutinized in every sphere, including the financial one. I want to disclose my wife's and my financial status, but, at the same time, I want to disclose my income, including taxes paid since 1992, when the new tax declaration system was introduced. I am going to pass all of these documents to the Sejm speaker, so they can be made public as soon as my opponent agrees to do the same.

[Skowronski] Have you managed to discover whether the Polisa shares acquired by your wife are included in your statement?

[Kwasniewski] I want to tell you that the statements concerning our financial status that we signed at the Sejm have become a source of many misunderstandings, not only to me but to others as well. They are misleading because we have to write in the statement: I have. This singular form does not make clear whether joint assets, including the spouse's, are to be mentioned. I did not declare the Polisa shares because they formed a part of my wife's economic activity. On the other hand, I think other deputies may have made mistakes, too, such as not mentioning cars belonging to their wives, which had been a part of joint assets.

I am going to ask the Sejm Presidium and maybe even the Constitutional Tribunal to give a ruling as to how this kind of statement should be written. I repeat, I did not declare my wife's Polisa shares, and I do not see this as an offense because this was caused by the obscure language of the questionnaire.

[Skowronski] Do you count on the support of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]?

[Kwasniewski] We have had talks on the issue. There is no pressure, there is no ultimatum or any other attempts to limit the right of an independent party such as the PSL to a sovereign decision. They are going to decide next week at a meeting of their Supreme Council. Yesterday there was a discussion, which was attended on the PSL side by Chairman Pawlak, Speakers Struzik and Zych, and Deputy Prime Ministers Jagielinski and Luczak, and it focused on the need to maintain and consolidate the coalition and to act in such way that the coalition will not be harmed and will not be opposed.

[Skowronski] Is this the confirmation of support in the runoff?

[Kwasniewski] I am not sure if this is the confirmation because it is not supported by a resolution. But this is an important position approved by a large majority—and maybe even by the entire PSL leadership—that maintaining the coalition is important, and obviously this is connected with wise and rational behavior of the PSL in the second round.

[Skowronski] But there is a split within the PSL. There are Waldemar Pawlak's supporters, and his strategy probably differs from that of the rest of the party.

[Kwasniewski] But the colleagues from the PSL constantly stress that this is going to be a collective decision, and I think the PSL's main problem is not what to do in the second round and whom to support, but how to assess the PSL's participation in the first round of the elections and the achieved result. This party is one of the main parties on the Polish political scene, and the result should be analyzed.

[Skowronski] What is your opinion about the quick support of Union of Freedom [UW] for Lech Walesa?

[Kwasniewski] I tell you frankly that I feel uneasy about it. In my view, for quite some time UW has been going into somewhat unknown directions as far as Polish politics are concerned. UW loses every election in a very consistent fashion, or at least achieves results far from its expectations. In 1990 UW told Poland not to vote for Lech Walesa and put forward Tadeusz Mazowiecki; in 1995 it considered Lech Walesa not a good candidate and put Jacek Kuron forward. He then said many times that people should vote for him because both main candidates were bad. Now, it appears that one evil seems to be not as bad, so let us vote for Lech Walesa.

What I cannot understand at all is the proreformist rhetoric. If we look at Lech Walesa's electorate, at regions of Poland voting for him, I think that to a large extent this is a conservative electorate. This is not the electorate for reforms. These are people with low education, people from centers facing problems with the restructuring of agriculture, such as southern Poland. This is not a typical backup for reforms. I can say that I agree with the opinion presented on television yesterday by a representative of the public opinion research institute Pentor that western and northern Poland, which voted for me, are more interested in the reforms and in getting involved in the process.

[Skowronski] Are you surprised that people are afraid to hand over full power to the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] and your party?

[Kwasniewski] In my view this is the fear that ignores the fact that we are living in a different Poland. We are living in Poland where there are different opportunities. One must not accept that the president has such a dominating influence on the political scene that everything is going to depend on him. First, the president's powers have not been limited to the

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extent portrayed by UW; second, parliament consists of different political parties; third, we have a large decree of economic independence as well as the independence of the media, judiciary, and local self-government. So, talk of domination is wrong.

On the other hand, I do not think UW would show the same concern if Hanna Suchocka were prime minister and Jacek Kuron were president. Then we would probably hear about a great chance for Polish reforms.

[Skowronski] How could it happen that Poland is divided between the one with Solidarity origin and the other one?

[Kwasniewski] This is not true. This is a false thesis and it should be rejected. Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski no longer symbolize the Polish People's Republic and Solidarity. A Walesa victory would not mean a return to Solidarity. A Kwasniewski victory would not mean a return to the Polish People's Republic. We are living in the Poland of 1995. If you notice the fact that in the 1993 elections 2.8 million people voted for the SLD and in this election 6.3 million people voted for me and I enjoy the greatest support among young people, then what Polish People's Republic are you talking about?

[Skowronski] Are you getting ready for the television debate?

[Kwasniewski] Of course I am.

[Skowronski] In what way?

[Kwasniewski] One cannot prepare oneself in any specific way.

[Skowronski] Are you afraid of the debate?

[Kwasniewski] No. I hope it will be a serious conversation enabling us to present our ideas so we can depart from the stereotype you are trying to suggest—that there are two Polands. No, there is only one Poland, but people can have different views. Today, the two most distinctive personalities that represent certain political ideas are Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski. And I think that this is a proper conclusion to be drawn from the first round.

[Skowronski] Thank you.

SLD leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski was today's guest of Radio Zet.

[Kwasniewski] Thank you and goodbye.

Kwasniewski Expounds on Poland's Future

MS0911114195 London THE EUROPEAN in English 9-15 Nov 95 p 4

[Report on an interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, Polish presidential candidate, by Tony Paterson in Warsaw; date not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] American-style cheerleaders and the red roses of social democracy greeted Polish presidential hopeful Aleksander Kwasniewski on the campaign trail as he strode into a basketball arena in the decaying factory town of Wloclawek.

When a brass band of uniformed railway workers struck up a Polish version of Happy Birthday to welcome the youthful challenger to President Lech Walesa, the 1,000-strong crowd, most of them factory workers, burst into rapturous applause.

Flanked by huge campaign slogans urging voters to "Choose the Future", Kwasniewski, 41, dressed in a sharp Italian suit, told his audience: "This election is not a battle between communists and Solidarity any more; those days have passed. We have to look ahead."

It was a slick performance, more reminiscent of a western politician from a modern social democratic party than a post-communist seeking votes in a former eastern bloc country which emerged from Soviet domination only six years ago.

The first round of the presidential contest on 5 November put Kwasniewski slightly ahead of the present incumbent, the former Solidarity leader and Nobel peace prize-winner Walesa. Each secured just over a third of the votes east, presaging a possible photo-finish in the second and final round of voting on 19 November.

Whether Kwasniewski, the leader of Poland's reformed communists, the Left Democrat Alliance (SLD) emerges triumphant will depend on the way backers of the other 11 first-round candidates vote in the second stage.

Crucial will be the supporters of Jacek Kuron, the former labour minister and anti-communist dissident who ran as candidate for the liberal Freedom Union party of former Solidarity intellectuals. Kuron, third in the first-round poll with nearly ten per cent of the vote, has since backed Walesa.

If anything, Poland's second presidential election since the collapse of communism in 1989 has shown that the country is split along traditional left/right lines. The right is represented by Walesa, who relies on his past heroics as the union leader who brought the old system to its knees. He says that only he is capable of safeguarding the country's future, never missing the chance to evoke the communist spectre.

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By contrast, Kwasniewski, although he was minister for youth and sport in the last orthodox communist government, has metamorphosed into a social democrat in the mould of Tony Blair, the British Labour Party leader.

At his office in Warsaw's Sejm parliament building—decorated, albeit prematurely, with the flag of the European Union—Kwasniewski told The European: "You cannot compare the Communist Party of Poland with communism in the Soviet Union or East Germany, where it was much more hardline."

Kwasniewski said that Polish communism had already reformed enough by 1989 to allow the historic round-table talks between the government and Solidarity which led to the first democratic elections since the Second World War.

"My strength is that, unlike Walesa, I do not accept that everybody who worked under the old system was wrong. I have tried to give back some dignity to the 50 and 60-year-olds who feel that their lives have been useless," he said.

Undoubtedly, his other strong point has been his appeal to younger voters, and to a new entrepreneurial class that wants to see a leader more suited to a Poland which is fully westernised and less influenced by the Catholic Church.

On this level Kwasniewski scores well: unlike Walesa, he speaks fluent English and German, is at home with world leaders and appears to have all the accoutrements of sophistication, including a portable telephone and a penchant for dieting and tennis.

His four-point campaign programme hardly smacks of authoritarianism. He wants a new constitution to end years of bickering between president and parliament over spheres of political influence. He is committed to using the benefits of lightning market reforms, which brought an astounding four per cent economic growth rate last year alone, to help Poland's five million poor.

At the same time he aims to decentralise administrative structures to give more power to provinces and municipalities. On key issues such as defence and European policy, he is, like Walesa, fully committed to Poland joining NATO and the European Union promptly.

For all his reasonableness, Kwasniewski is plagued by the "communist" tag. He has tried to turn it to his advantage by claiming that Poland needs a post-communist president who, unlike Walesa, would be able to work hand-in-hand with the post-communist government.

He says that the old guard of hardline communists has retired and handed over power to younger reformers like himself, and he insists that Poland is now at a stage where reconciliation between communists and Solidarity Supporters is vital. "The politician I admire most is Spain's Felipe Gonzalez," he said. "He runs a country in which people can put flowers on the graves of dead fascist leaders and nobody makes a fuss."

However admirable, that vision of a Poland fully reconciled with its past may not be enough to persuade voters for whom the 40-odd years before 1989 are still a vivid and painful memory.

It could just be that Kwasniewski has arrived a little too early. As German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is said to have told him on visit to Warsaw: "Well, Mr Kwasniewski, I like you; you are a good man but you come from a very bad party."

PSL May Withdraw Support for Kwasniewski

AU0811134195 Paris AFP in English 1308 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, Nov 8 (AFP)—Former communist Aleksander Kwasniewski's bid to replace President Lech Walesa ran into trouble Wednesday [8 November], as he admitted he had failed to declare an investment his wife made, and as the Polish Peasants Party threatened to withdraw support.

There is a risk of "major political friction" if the Polish Peasants Party (PSL) refuses to back Kwasniewski, a former official of the reformed communists Longin Pastusiak told AFP Wednesday.

Kwasniewski won the first round of the Polish presidential elections, ahead of incumbent Lech Walesa, according to official results Tuesday.

PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak and his party will take a definitive decision next Tuesday, five days away from the second round of elections, he added.

The PSL—which together with the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance forms the ruling coalition—is to decide rapidly on changes in party management, Franciszek Stefaniuk, one of the PSL leaders, said. It scored only four percent of votes in the first round of elections.

Leaders of the PSL, a large section of which is considered close to Catholic bishops, along with the neo-communists, claim to be "certain of the solidarity of the coalition," Stefaniuk added, but they seem divided on abortion issues and the democratic process.

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Silence has been maintained over these bones of contention for months, but the issues have re-emerged in the climate of election campaigning.

In a further potentially damaging admission, Kwasniewski earlier Wednesday said he had failed to declare to parliament a major investment made by his wife.

However, he said he had only omitted the investment, which he said was worth some 20,000 dollars, because he had misunderstood the form he filled out, where the verb "possess" was written in the singular.

Meanwhile, Walesa prepared to pick up the threads of his association with Solidarity, the trade union that he founded to fight the former communist regime but was a victim of its own success.

In a bid for victory in the run-off second round of the presidential elections on November 19, Walesa was to meet with leaders of five centrist parties that failed to make it through the first round.

Walesa has also won the support of Solidarity itself, but he will need all the help he can get to make up the distance on Kwasniewski, who took the first round with 35.11 percent of the vote against the outgoing president's 33.11 percent.

Daily Says Banks Submit Own Consolidation Drafts

WS0711152795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Nov 95 p 18

[Article by Konrad Sadurski: "Draft of Consolidation and Privatization of Banks; Escape from Fusion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The government keeps putting off the date of examining the draft of setting up two great holding banks. Meanwhile, boards of directors of some of the banks are terrified at the Finance Ministry's vision and are nervously working on their own privatization plans.*

After nine commercial banks were separated from the National Bank of Poland [NBP] in 1989, bankers are now waiting for another government decision that is just as important for the Polish financial system. It is a decision regarding unification of banks. Today, however, the government will most probably once again take a look at the bank consolidation draft.

The government's decision will determine the shape of the banking sector five or seven years from now. According to Antoni Reczka, head of the Coopers & Coopers consulting company, this time will be needed to prepare the merger of the big five banks owned by the Finance Ministry.

Great Mergers

The government has already decided that the large number of banks competing with one another will be replaced by two strong groups of banks. They are to become financial strongholds that would be capable of competing successfully with foreign rivals, which we will have to admit to our country in 1997.

The government imagines that immediately after consolidation the banks will be rapidly privatized. It would be best if they were privatized in 1996, which would make it possible to use the money ($450 million) provided by the Fund for Privatization of Polish Banks (most of the money has been donated by foreign countries). This sum is more or less equal to the funds of the banks that will set up the two holding banks.

The government has already decided that the head banks in the new structures will be Pekao SA and Bank Handlowy. The Finance Minister will give them the shares of Pomorski Bank Kredytowy [PBK], Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy [BDK], and Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy [PBG]. However, the government has not decided yet which banks will be controlled by Pekao SA and which will be under Bank Handlowy.

The Pekao Group

Unofficial information that supervisory boards have given to the boards of directors of the banks suggests that Pekao SA will most probably take over the Lodz-based PBG and the Lublin-based BDK.

The latter recently presented the government with its own vision of privatization. BDK President Wlodzimierz Kosacki argues that the strategic investor might be the Korean concern of Daewoo. The Koreans are prepared to buy 30 percent of the BDK shares.

Bankers do not rule out that the Finance Ministry will want Pekao SA to also take over the shares of Polski Bank Rozwoju [PBR], which would fulfill the function of the holding bank's investment branch. It is not known how this would actually be put into effect because the PBR is a public company listed on the Stock Exchange. Therefore, a decision regarding its merger with Pekao SA would require the consent of not only the Finance Ministry, but also all of the other PBR shareholders.

The Bank Handlowy Group

Bankers believe that Bank Handlowy will most probably take over the PBK. Its board of directors is preparing a memo for the finance minister, in which it wants to present its own method of privatization. Also in this case, the purpose is to avoid being merged with the holding bank.

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"We have two serious investors. One of them is an American bank that is interested in buying a 25-percent stake," we were told yesterday by Barbara Bartkowiak, president of the Szczecin-based PBK.

Most probably included in the Bank Handlowy holding group will also be Polski Bank Inwestycyjny [PBI]. However, the NBP, which is its owner, submits one condition: Aside from PBI, Bank Handlowy should also take over Prosper Bank, which is being rescued from bankruptcy (and which is owned almost 100-percent by the NBP).

Banks for Senior Citizens

As we were told in the Finance Ministry, in the first stage Pekao SA and Bank Handlowy would be the owners of the shares of the banks that merged with them. For a certain period of time all of them would operate side by side under their own names. However, they would also be getting ready for the merger. For this purpose they would have to standardize the network or branch offices, as well as introduce the same internal regulations and management system.

Our interlocutors claim that Pekao SA is not planning to merge with the banks it will control over the next 10 years. It will only work out a joint work schedule to prevent the constituent banks from competing with each other.

The next stage of the governmental consolidation and privatization plan would involve the transfer of 51 percent of the shares of both holding banks as the starting capital to retirement pension funds. In this way, the ministry would like to pay off the budget debt to pensioners and senior citizens (the debt amounts to approximately 65 trillion old zlotys). However, there is no law that regulates establishment and operations of such funds.

Future of Civil Aviation 'Quite Bright'

MM0811164995 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 24 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by "P.K.": "LOT Stays On: Three Passenger and Cargo Airports To Open Soon—In Bydgoszcz, Biala Podlaska, and Krzywa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The size of the network of airports and flight connections in Poland is only one-fourth of its European counterparts, while the geographical disposition of Polish airports shows a marked lack of balance. The relatively large number of airports in the west of Poland represents a legacy of the former Soviet military presence there, whereas there is a clear shortage of airports in our country's eastern territories. Now both the State Airports Enterprise and LOT Polish Airlines want to expand local air connections and develop regional airports. Although theoretically the latter could also serve foreign flight connections, unfortunately there is not much demand at present to maintain such connections as the one between Krakow and the United States.

LOT Polish Airlines holds a virtual monopoly on the domestic flight market because it serves as many as 90 percent of all internal air connections. This state of affairs is certainly not likely to change in the next few years. LOT has concentrated chiefly on serving foreign flight connections, but, in addition, it intends to support the development of regional airports, especially those in Poznan, Katowice, Krakow, Gdansk, and Wroclaw. The regional airport of Wroclaw-Strachowice, whose facilities are beginning to be taken seriously in our part of Europe, is developing especially well.

It has been suggested for a long time now that LOT's monopoly should be broken and that a proportion of its assets should be distributed among regional aviation centers. This does not seem to be such a good idea because the country does still need a major carrier capable of both handling the bulk of international air connections and updating their fleet through the purchase of modern aircraft such as Boeings. On the other hand, it seems realistic to expect our regional airports to achieve independence over the next few years. Unfortunately, they themselves are not too eager to strive for that goal because the status of being subsidiaries of the State Airports Enterprise gives them plenty of privileges.

Work on three new passenger and cargo airports is already highly advanced, and the airports, which will serve Bydgoszcz, Biala Podlaska (where an existing military airport has been handed over to civil aviation authorities), and Krzywa in Legnica Voivodship, are scheduled to be commissioned very soon. The airport at Krzywa has particularly high chances of future dynamic development because it is located at the junction of two proposed freeways. In addition, the new airport at Biala Podlaska should have interesting prospects owing to its proximity to the Belarusian border and the fact that large regional trade fairs are traditionally organized in the area.

All in all, the future of Polish civil aviation promises to be quite bright, not least because of the recent comprehensive updating of its air fleet carried out by LOT, which replaced the long-serving Tupolevs with Boeings. It is thanks to the rejuvenated air fleet that our civil aviation can now successfully compete with foreign airlines, even though it was not so long ago that it seemed inevitable that LOT would collapse and its remains would be taken over by one of the world's aviation giants.

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Iliescu Views Reform, Hungarian Relations, NATO

AU0911083595 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 2 Nov 95 p 3

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by unidentified EURONEWS Television Channel correspondent; place and date not given: "President Ion Iliescu, Last Week's European Personality on EURONEWS"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Mr. President, you were reelected as Romania's president in 1992. At that time, a lot of people doubted your will to make a clean break with the past. Certain critics said that you have only changed the formula, namely, that you resorted to a clever combination of populism and nationalism to reach the same results. Three years later, have you managed to prove your detractors wrong?

[Iliescu] These matters should also be viewed objectively, not only subjectively. If we are to talk about the Romanian revolution, I must say that I was the one who read the Revolution Proclamation on 22 December 1989, with its 10 points on the major targets of the Romanian revolution, including the elimination of totalitarianism, the monopoly of a single party, and the transition to a democratic regime, the state of law, and a democratic system characterized by the freedom of expression and organization. [passage omitted] Six years later, one can see that the main guidelines of that revolution program have been implemented. The totalitarian system was liquidated, and we now have a free, multiparty system, that is political pluralism, with more than 200 registered parties. [passage omitted] Given the explosion of newspapers, with more than 1,500 in print, a joke is currently making the rounds in Romania, namely, that "we have more newspapers than journalists." [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Do you believe that the transition from communism to a democratic regime has been in keeping with the principles of the program you have launched?

[Iliescu] I can say that we now have an absolutely democratic system from a legislative and constitutional viewpoint as well as in the sphere of life itself. However, the consolidation of democracy is a process, which also implies the social and economic spheres and a political democracy devoid of an economic foundation cannot be complete. I believe that the most difficult process for us is the economic transition, which has already made a few steps. [passage omitted] In the sphere of economic reform, I believe that the most important process now is the great privatization, which is at a crucial point at this time. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Let us proceed, if you do not mind, to certain matters pertaining to your close neighbors. [passage omitted] What can you tell us about the relations between Romania and Hungary and the situation of the Hungarian minority?

[Iliescu] This is a problem with historical roots, pertaining to the former occupation of Transylvania—a traditional Romanian province, actually one of the three provinces, which was under the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—which has left traces on the Romanian-Hungarian relations, creating a certain sensitiveness in this respect. This problem should be understood in its historical context. It is a problem similar to the one currently faced by the Russians in the new—formerly Soviet—republics, where they became minorities, such as the Russians in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, or Moldova. The Hungarians also had to go through a similar psychological shock; they were a minority in Transylvania before and became a national minority after Transylvania's unification with the other Romanian provinces in the wake of World War I, which marked the creation of the national Romanian state. Therefore, there is a certain sensitiveness on the part of the Hungarians on this matter. At the same time, one can talk about a sensitiveness on the part of the Romanians, too, who had no rights whatsoever in the period of the imperial occupation of Transylvania. When revisionist trends emerge, they rely on the experience of the 40's, when Hungary again occupied half of Transylvania in the wake of the Vienna Diktat imposed by Hitler. Each Hungarian claim represents a shock for the Romanians whom have not forgotten the lessons of history. Therefore, I believe that, given the new democratic framework and development of both Hungary and Romania, and given the new relations between our countries and their desire for European integration, we will find solutions. I believe that there is a perfectly democratic framework for ensuring the rights of the minorities, in general, and of the Hungarian minority, in particular, since it is the largest in number. All minorities together represent some 10 percent of the population, with the Hungarians amounting to some 7 percent of the population. They have all rights and are represented in parliament and the local councils and they have a network of Hungarian-language schools, artistic institutions, press, radio, and television in their mother tongue. Consequently, they have all possible rights. Regarding the relations between Romania and Hungary, I believe that they are the best, compared to our relations with the other neighbors, in the economic, political, and even military spheres. At a human level, there are no longer limitations regarding the free movement of citizens. Therefore, we have good grounds for the historic reconciliation proposal we have made to Hungary, by taking the French-German model as an example.

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[Correspondent] In this respect, you are bordering on a rather explosive neighboring region, due to the conflict in the Balkans, where you have played a mediating role. [passage omitted] How do you see the future unfolding at the Peace Conference in Paris, which seems to be essential for the maintenance of the cease-fire and for the end of the war?

[Iliescu] Our relations with Yugoslavia have always been among the best. We hailed this decisive step—the cease-fire—at the Malta meeting, which was attended by the presidents of Bosnia, Mr. Izetbegovic, and Yugoslavia, Mr. Lilic, as well as by the representatives of Croatia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. [passage omitted] This is a first step, which must be consolidated. Now, we are sure that it will be easy to find the most convenient solutions. I believe it is good to discuss, negotiate, and talk to one another. This is a decisive step, and I believe that solutions can be found both for Bosnia, on the one hand, and for the relations between Croatia and Serbia, on the other, so as to create a normal situation in the entire Yugoslav space. This is the problem. The other one is the normalization of the relations between former Yugoslavia with its neighbors, since we, the neighbors—I am referring to Romania, Bulgaria, and other countries—have lost a lot because of the embargo. As far as Romania is concerned, the losses amount to $8 billion, due to the interruption of direct economic ties and of the Danube River and railroad traffic. Therefore, the normalization of the situation in Yugoslavia and the lifting of the embargo are a vital matter not only for Yugoslavia, but for its neighbors, as well. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Not everybody has got rid of the phantoms of the past. For instance, Russia has not stopped resorting to threats whenever there is a possibility of NATO integration. You see, there is a fear of insecurity, which may affect future developments, to a certain extent.

[Iliescu] On the other hand, one must realize the totally different situation prevailing in Russia. We understand very well the hardships of this process over there. For our size, this political, social, and economic transition is tough and extremely difficult. I can understand the great difficulties faced by such a large system, which is the Russian space, in promoting democracy in a country devoid of any kind of democratic tradition. They only have the tradition of the Czarist empire and of the Soviet empire. Therefore, it is more difficult for such a society to promote new relations and create a rule-of-law state and democratic framework, on the one hand, and to turn a centralized economy into a free market economy on such a large territory, on the other. However, I hope that, although it may take longer than it took the others—after all, there is no way back in this respect—Russia will have to take this step, this transition. However, we must cooperate with Russia. I believe it was right for NATO and the United States to keep emphasizing that Russia is not considered an adversary. There has been a profound change in Europe and the world. There is no longer a bipolar division of the world. NATO is treating Russia as a potential partner and the new European structures must look upon Russia as a future partner in the sphere of economic integration, too. As for us, while expressing our firm desire and determination to integrate ourselves into the European and euro-atlantic structures—after all, we were the first to sign the Partnership for Peace with NATO, and we want to become full members of the organization—we have done that without any kind of hostility toward Russia or other states. On the contrary, we consider it necessary to find all possible ways and means to develop a partnership with our neighbors, including our farther neighbors such as Russia. We no longer have common borders with Russia, but we have a common zone of the Black Sea and an intermediary, our large neighbor, Ukraine, with which we want to develop good relations. [passage omitted]

Iliescu, Senators Discuss Reconciliation Proposal

AU0811214295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's President Ion Iliescu met with the members of the Senate's Foreign Policy Commission, at Cotroceni Palace today, at their request. The subject of the talks was the Romanian president's initiative for Romanian-Hungarian historic reconciliation.

According to the press communique released by the presidency, the signatories emphasized that they took the initiative of calling this meeting to discuss the proposal launched by President Ion Iliescu on 30 August 1995 on a historic reconciliation between Romania and Hungary. They expressed the opinion that it is necessary to increase the parliamentary and diplomatic actions to support and maintain the idea of Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation domestically and internationally.

Mr. Marcel Dinu, state secretary at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who attended the meeting, pointed out that the Budapest officials have responded positively to the idea of a historic reconciliation between the Romanian and Hungarian nations and decided to finish the examination of the documents forwarded to them by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 15 December, after which the negotiations proper on these proposals should start in January 1996, concurrently

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with the continuation of negotiations on finalizing the bilateral basic treaty.

Welcoming the concern of the Senate's Foreign Policy Commission with backing the actions on the implementation of the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation idea, Romania's President Ion Iliescu said, among other things, that the direct dialogue between the Romanian and Hungarian Governments should be continued, along with constantly briefing the public at large on the latest developments to lend support to the reconciliation process.

Prime Minister Meets With FRY Delegation

LD0811194395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1834 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Nov. 8 (TANJUG)—Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu said on Wednesday that Romania believed in peace and wanted to establish normal relations with [the Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia [FRY], after the sanctions on Yugoslavia have been lifted and peace in Bosnia achieved.

In a statement to TANJUG after talks with a Yugoslav Parliament delegation, Vacaroiu said a team of experts in Belgrade was framing a draft political contract between Romania and Yugoslavia on good neighborly relations, to be discussed during the visit of a Romanian delegation to Belgrade at the end of the month.

Vacaroiu said he was convinced a formula would be found to achieve peace in Bosnia, and indicated that Romania highly appreciated the constructive and flexible stand of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, whose role in the peace process was very important.

As for the upcoming meeting, Vacaroiu said he expected specific agreements on cooperation, including the support to Yugoslav nations for overcoming their current difficulties.

Again we have intervened with the U.N. sanctions committee to settle certain demands by the Yugoslav side, said Vacaroiu, specifically humanitarian support and aid in fuel.

Head of the Yugoslav delegation, Chairman of the upper house foreign relations committee Borisan Jovic, said Vacaroiu supported Yugoslavia's peace policy and was convinced it would bring results.

Jovic said it was important that inter-state accords were concluded, to 'secure the prerequisites for the more efficacious work of the economies to the benefit of both sides.'

[Word indistinct] also discussed improving conditions for bilateral communication, particularly in view of local border trade, said Jovic.

Jovic on Goals, EU Integration

AU0811212095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Nicolae Vacaroiu, prime minister of the government, today received a parliamentary delegation led by Dr. Borislav Jovic, president of the Chamber of Citizen's Foreign Policy Commission of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly. According to information received by fax from the government, the prime minister emphasized the Romanian people's desire to elevate the relations with Yugoslavia to the level of their real potential, concurrently with the achievement of peace and the lifting of economic sanctions.

Thanking Romania for its principled position throughout the Yugoslav crisis and for its efforts to pacify the region, Mr. Borislav Jovic said that there are two priority goals at this time: concluding the peace process as speedily as possible and paving the way for future cooperation. The guest also expressed the desire for partnership in the effort to integrate the two states in the EU structures.

Tudor's Letter Suggests Vacaroiu Opposes Iliescu

AU0711173495 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 1 Nov 95 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "C.V. Tudor's Accomplices"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Under the title "Gods and Pygmies," Corneliu Vadim Tudor [leader of the Greater Romania Party, PRM] published an "Open Letter to the Members and Sympathizers of the PRM" in the latest issue of his weekly [ROMANIA MARE]. The loquacity of the PRM leader stretches over four pages. As far as we know, the members and sympathizers of the PRM are needy people. At least that is what Corneliu Vadim Tudor claims. One can assume that in their situation they do not have much time. Therefore, I doubt that a letter of such proportions will be read to the end by those to whom it is addressed. No doubt, C.V. Tudor could have made it much shorter and reduced it, for example, to two sentences: "Brothers, I am insane! Help me!" And here we are not joking. When reading that letter, not only an expert in mental diseases, but also the common citizen can realize that Tudor's ailment has reached its peak. From the beginning to end, the letter expresses the obsession of the PRM leader that he is the herald of God on earth. [passage omitted]

Tudor discloses the fact that some of Ion Iliescu's associates share his views, indeed, they strive to implement

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them. Thus, we learn that Justice Minister Gavril Iosif Chiuzbaian allegedly opposed the interference of Ion Iliescu and Virgil Magureanu [head of the Romanian Intelligence Service] in the lifting of C.V. Tudor's parliamentary immunity. From the written statements of the PRM leader we also learn that Nicolae Vacaroiu is "fed up with the brutal interference of some 'political commissars' from the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] or from abroad." In his letter, Tudor reveals that he allegedly learned of the above during a confidential dialogue with the prime minister. From the PRM leader's letter we also learn that Generals Costica Voicu, Dumitru Cristea, Ion Suceava, Gheorghe Carp, and George Ioan Danescu [deputy interior minister] confessed to C.V. Tudor that they were extremely annoyed by the "countless robberies that are taking place and are the cause of people's difficult life." This is actually a sensational disclosure. It confirms the theory of some political analysts and politicians that Tudor's attacks on Iliescu and the PDSR are not the adventure on which a lone irritated artist has embarked. Obscure forces are hiding behind the campaign led by the PRM leader. The representatives of those forces can be found in various institutions of the authorities. Two of the people Tudor named in the letter did not need to be revealed for us to realize that they are the PRM leader's accomplices. Vacaroiu, for example, is among the few people around Ion Iliescu whom Corneliu Vadim Tudor's foul mouth not only avoids, but who also benefits from Tudor's brazen eulogy. If we think that Nicolae Vacaroiu displayed a more than dubious caution towards C.V. Tudor's antipresidential attacks, we have all the reasons to believe that, starting from the disclosures in the latest letter written by the PRM leader, it is more than a reward for ROMANIA MARE continuing to consider him the best prime minister in the history of Romania. The disclosure about Gavril Iosif Chiuzbaian's statements that lifting Tudor's parliamentary immunity would be staged by the Cotroceni [presidency] can also be believed. To the questions of the General Prosecuting Magistracy, the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] justice minister displayed a more than dubious stuttering. Those whom the PRM leader mentioned as sharing his virulent criticism of Ion Iliescu are people who got to their respective positions thanks to the president's goodwill. The fact that they can be at the same time both Iliescu's and Tudor's men should not surprise us. We are living in the Balkans, in a state that blows hot and cold, and the state of the famous leg in a cast [reference to Deputy Defense Minister Stanculescu during the Ceausescu regime]. It would be unfair completely to exclude the possibility that the so-called disclosures from the PRM leader's letter are pure fabrications. If that is the case, then Vacaroiu, Chiuzbaian, and Danescu, and all the others indicated by Corneliu Vadim Tudor as sharing his anti-Iliescu vehemence, should urgently issue a denial. However, no matter how optimistic I might be, I am afraid that they will not do that. Nevertheless, I am still waiting for it.

Funar Wants PDSR Officials' Immunity Lifted

AU0711153795 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 2 Nov 95 p 3

[Unsigned note: "Gheorghe Funar Calls on Ion Iliescu To Lift the Parliamentary Immunity of Adrian Nastase and Oliviu Gherman"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], yesterday sent an open letter to President Ion Iliescu. This time, the head of state is called upon to approach the General Magistracy with a request to lift the parliamentary immunity of those involved in the "apartment" report, that is, dignitaries who occupy or have occupied illegally acquired apartments.

Therefore, following the Greater Romania Party [PRM], another "justice-minded" party is attacking the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], although it is its ally in the government. Since the report accuses, among others, such prominent representatives of the authorities as Adrian Nastase [president of the Chamber of Deputies], Oliviu Gherman [Senate speaker], and Traian Chebeleu [presidential spokesman], it represents an important source of electoral capital for the PUNR, whose deputies do not appear in the report. This is not the first time that the PUNR has profited from such a situation. Nevertheless, this time, the PUNR leader's requests are much more unpleasant for Ion Iliescu. [passage omitted]

Nastase Rejects Funar's Demand

AU0911105295 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 3 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by Ortansa Teodor: "Adrian Nastase Comments on Funar's Letter and on Rumors About the Government Reshuffle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Mr. Funar should apply to be admitted in the Writers' Union because he writes a lot and pretty badly at that. Probably no one ever reports to him on what is going on in Parliament, so he has no way of knowing. In a way, I see this as intent to incriminate the PDSR" [Social Democracy Party of Romania], stated Adrian Nastase yesterday in connection with the letter sent by Funar to President Iliescu. "We also think it proper that measures should be taken whenever there is need for them. However, this time we believe that the

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issue raised by the Cluj mayor [Funar] is not the major political problem of the moment," added Nastase.

Asked to comment on the rumors about a possible cabinet reshuffle following the conclusion of the PDSR Standing Delegation session, Mr. Nastase replied: "There are always circumstances favoring cabinet reshuffles, but right now I have no knowledge of any such thing."

Deputies Alter Education Bill to Students' Demands

AU0811160195 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Lia Bejan: "Chamber of Deputies Legislates Majority of Students' Demands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The deputies' interest in discussing the proposals to alter and supplement the Education Law was minimal. Most of the opposition deputies were absent, so that for a few moments it seemed that the session would be suspended for lack of a quorum. The decisions made by the Chamber of Deputies' education panel, which were expressed in concrete texts intended to alter the Education Law, were contested during the plenary session by the very members of the panel. Things that were challenged from the rostrum by speakers expressing their individual opinions were then accepted as the official position and voted for. The head of the education panel, PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] Deputy Romulus Dabu, who was invited to the microphone by [Chamber of Deputies Speaker] Adrian Nastase, to express the panel's opinion on one of the articles of the law, voiced the PDSR position on the issue, which was in flagrant contradiction with the solution selected by the panel. A similarly contradictory stance was displayed by Education Minister Liviu Maior, who in a news conference held following the debates, criticized the compromise solutions agreed upon by the Chamber of Deputies Education Panel and the representatives of the students. Initially he pointed out that he did not wish to talk about his personal opinion, but in the end, he felt compelled to admit that he had not been authorized by the government to adopt such a position. Concretely, Maior considers that the alterations operated in the law act as a counterreform of the Romanian education system.

With a minimum quorum present, they passed 11 of the 13 articles proposed to be amended, most of which were left in the form in which the education panel had formulated them. Thus, no fees are to be paid any longer for repeating exams or repeating study years; the decisions on keeping or deposing the university rectors are to be made by the university senates within 30 days of the rectors' suspension; the students are to be represented at a proportion of 1/4 in the councils of faculties and university senates. As a consequence of an amendment requested by the Education Ministry and accepted by panel chairman Romulus Dabu, the chamber of deputies passed an article stipulating that the scholarships paid to high school and university students should be indexed [adjusted to inflation] and even the lowest ones of them should cover at least the expenses for lodging, meals, transportation, and school and university textbooks. Thus they modified the initial amendment formulated by the panel, which stipulated that 20 percent of the scholarships should be earmarked for high school and university textbooks. Due to the hasty way in which Nastase closed the session, the debates on the article cutting the [students'] public transportation costs were adjourned until next week.

Alterations to Penal, Penal Procedure Codes

AU0711211995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During today's session, the Chamber of Deputies concluded the debates on the legislative proposal to alter and supplement the Education Law. The proposal was passed with 257 votes in favor and 12 against.

The deputies then proceeded to rediscuss certain texts of the draft bill on the altering and supplementing of the Penal Code and Penal Procedure Code. According to the alterations they passed, the draft bill punishes the hoisting of the flags or other insignia, as well as the playing—publicly and in a group—of the anthems of foreign countries, except for the cases stipulated by law, if this is done with the obvious intent to contest the national, sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible nature of the Romanian state.

Another alteration stipulates that in the case of infractions committed against the spouses, children, or parents of persons holding high-level offices or who represent public authorities, if this is done to intimidate them or take revenge for actions they take as their duty, the maximum prison penalty stipulated by law should be augmented by one third.

The deputies then proceeded to examine the articles of the legislative initiative regarding the organization and functioning of political parties. [passage omitted]

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Federal

Jovanovic Comments on Dayton Summit, Angolan Ties

LD0811214295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2110 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 8 (TANJUG)—Serbian parliamentary official Slobodan Jovanovic said Wednesday [8 November] that lasting peace in former Yugoslavia could be reached by honoring the principle of full equality of all peoples, for peace must be just to be permanent.

In talks with a senior Angolan delegation, headed by the deputy director general of the National Petroleum company, Botelio Vasconcelos, Jovanovic said he expected the principle would be observed in the Dayton summit and a favorable settlement achieved, including the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic, chairman of the parliament's foreign relations committee, said he hoped cooperation with Angola would be promoted after the sanctions have been lifted.

Relations with Angola are a model for developing cooperation with other African countries, said a statement released by the parliament.

Angola was Yugoslavia's most important economic partner in Africa before the sanctions were imposed on May 30, 1992.

The Angolan delegation agreed that bilateral relations be promoted, after the lifting of the sanctions, in all fields—economic, cultural and sports.

Radio Claims 'Breakthrough' Expected in Dayton

AU0911095895 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 9 Nov 95

[Report by Zoran Jevdjovic from Dayton]

[FBIS Translated Text] A breakthrough in the peace process within the framework of negotiations regarding the future of Bosnia is expected in Dayton today. Namely, following the revision of remarks presented to the mediators by all sides from the former Yugoslavia, it is expected that an updated draft of the general framework agreement might be disclosed. After that, the negotiators could focus more on issues pertaining to territorial demarcation which are considered to be the toughest part of the Dayton summit.

Yesterday, the Yugoslav delegation on several occasions met with the hosts, as well as with international representatives. Members of the U.S. negotiating team thanked our representatives for their efforts in the release of the U.S. journalist from Bijeljina jail.

Croatian President Tudjman is expected to return, which indicates that the next phase of the negotiations will be crucial for comprehensive relations in the former Yugoslavia; therefore, the negotiations will be held with the participation of all parties.

Opposition Leader Negative Toward Ohio Talks

LD0811173095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 Nov (TANJUG)—The chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia said today that the peace talks in Dayton will not produce anything new which has not already been seen in the negotiating process.

Kostunica told a news conference that the Serbs have made significant concessions in the Geneva and New York agreements. However, based on reports from the United States, he is of the opinion that further attempts to create a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow. He said that the Dayton negotiations are taking place within the framework set by the Geneva and New York agreements and that possible changes in relation to the two agreements could harm only the Serb side.

According to Kostunica, the beginning of the Dayton talks was marked by the events in Srebrenica and efforts to exploit the media coverage of crimes committed there. At the same time, the international community does not consider Croatian crimes committed in Krajina relevant to the resolution of the problem of the Srem-Baranja region, Kostunica said. He said that raising the issue of human rights and ethnic minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is primarily being boiled down to territorial autonomy.

"Such standards do not exist in the international community, and even if they did exist and were implemented, the face of the whole world would be changed," he said.

Kostunica said that games with The Hague Tribunal in Dayton made nonsense of any concept of justice and independence within the legal system and that The Hague tribunal for war crimes committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia has become a mere appendage of daily policymaking.

Defense Minister Views Army Budget, Draft

AU0911084395 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28-29 Oct 95 pp 10-11

[Interview with FRY Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic by Stevan Zec and Jovan Zaric; place and date not given: "Country's Defense Is a State Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At this moment, Pavle Bulatovic, federal defense minister and member of the FRY

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Government, certainly belong to the most prominent circle of desirable interviewees for all domestic as well as world newspapers because the military situation in the Balkans, and therefore in Yugoslavia, is at the center of world events. While we were establishing the details for this interview for BORBA, it turned out that even the correspondents who write about the Yugoslav Army are not thoroughly informed about the competence and responsibility of the Federal Defense Ministry. Thus, the possible "hot" topical and certainly interesting questions been been left without answers for the simple reason that they come under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff or even, more often, of the Supreme Defense Council.

[BORBA] What are the real powers of the Defense Ministry?

[Bulatovic] There is a lot of misunderstanding or insufficient knowledge of the powers of the Defense Ministry and the powers, that is, the competence of the General Staff, that is, the Supreme Defense Council.

What sometimes happens is that I receive letters addressing me as minister of the army or minister for military affairs. The basic difference is defined in the FRY Constitution and the federal law on defense and the army. In a word, during war or peace, the Yugoslav Army is commanded by the president of the republic in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defense Council, which, apart from him, includes the presidents of the republics that are members of the Federation. The Army General Staff is the highest expert and staff body for the preparation and employment of the army in war or peace. The Federal Defense Ministry performs administrative and professional duties that refer to realizing the policy of the country's defense and implementing the defense system. As a Federal Government ministry, it is obliged to ensure the economic and administrational prerequisites for the efficient functioning of the defense system. Therefore, neither the Federal Government nor the Defense Ministry are superior to the General Staff, nor is the opposite the case. There is a need for cooperation regarding the issues of defense as defense is a broader term than the Yugoslav Army. I would say that not all jurisdiction issues are precisely established. That is being worked upon; there will probably be a need to draft some amendments to the law on the army and the laws on defense that would separate the jurisdiction and thereby avoid overlaps where they are not needed. [passage omitted]

[BORBA] How does the federal state function in the sphere of defense since several bodies—the Supreme Defense Council, Government, Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Customs—deal in these issues? Are there any problems there?

[Bulatovic] This could also be treated as a two-track issue. No problems can exist between the Army and the internal affairs bodies as the activities of the internal affairs bodies are regulated by a special law, just as the functioning of other bodies is. The laws are clear and precise, which does not mean that, in practice, certain problems may not break out. Of course, there has not been much time since 1992, when the buildup of the state began on new foundations and, along with that, the buildup of the Army and all other factors in the defense system. [passage omitted]

[BORBA] Is our military budget adequate to the times and place we live in?

[Bulatovic] It is a fact that the military budget for 1996 and the previous years was established at a relatively low level. It is far below the desired level, but is adjusted to the country's economic capabilities, considering the economic policy concept that there can be no deficit spending of the budget in any sphere, including the financing of defense. The budget for 1995 is 1.611 billion dinars, which is low compared to the Croatian budget for the same year, which was $5.2 billion. This is an impressive sum and is much higher than what the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] allocated for the army in the best years, when the military budget amounted to $3.8 at the highest. However, the Yugoslav Army and other defense structures are carrying out a significant process of rationalization, a literal saving. Therefore, only the activities that ensure the combat readiness of army units at the evaluated level to which the FRY borders are threatened are financed, so development programs, scientific research work, and the like are eliminated, which represents a serious problem in the long run, due to the departure of personnel and the failure to allocate sufficient funds for developing new combat systems.

[BORBA] What is the standard of living of officers and soldiers during military service and military pensioners?

[Bulatovic] Due to such an economic situation, the standard of living of the professional members of the army and soldiers during military service is low. We should only consider how many professional army members have no flats: almost 20,000 people; that is, 60,000 including families. This figure is certainly worrying and a warning. Housing is one of the most important elements of the standard of living of the members of the army and all other structures. Unfortunately, for known reasons, we are forced to increase the financing of the activities that directly serve combat readiness at the cost of the

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standard of living of officers and civilians employed by the Yugoslav Army. [passage omitted]

On Response and Defeatism

[BORBA] What is the response to the draft and military exercises?

[Bulatovic] One must say that the response to regular military service and to military exercises is high. However, what has been happening in the past three years? Some army draftees ignore their debt to the fatherland, and they are mostly members of national minorities. The reasons are pacifist, but also the result of the influence of various political parties or movements that support the evasion of any kind of military summons, of army service, or of mobilization. A number of citizens have left the country partly because of army service. We do not have precise data on that number as it is hard to tell if it is only because of army service. There are certainly economic and other reasons. [passage omitted]

[BORBA] There is this question of minorities and their attitude toward the defense and their response to military summons. What are the attitudes of the Kosovo Albanians, the Hungarians, and the Muslims?

[Bulatovic] The attitudes differ. In the case of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Romanians, and other minorities, their response is far greater than in the case of the Albanians. The activity of political parties and the Kosovo Albanians' boycott of the state and its constitutional-legal system and failure to implement its solutions are certainly the decisive factors influencing their attitude to army service. I think that such a situation cannot last long because all citizens of the state are equal in their rights and obligations in any sense, including military service. Therefore, one cannot tolerate a situation in which only Serbs and Montenegrins and not all able-bodied citizens of the state have an obligation to serve in the army. This is the state of citizens and not an ethnic state. [passage omitted]

[BORBA] NATO no longer seems to have any adversaries. What is happening with the Russian Federation and are there any signs of a counterbalance being formed?

[Bulatovic] The misfortune that has hit the Soviet Union, its breaking apart, has destroyed the image of a huge military and world superpower, and NATO, of course, quickly took advantage of this to serve its own position. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian Federation should, realistically and objectively, be treated as a power, especially from the aspect of the number of people and economic resources that it possesses and its military potential in the sense of its armaments and military equipment, right up to the top weapons in the sphere of nuclear weaponry and other weapons of mass destruction. Despite this present crisis in the Russian Federation, I think that Russia must have a defined interest toward central and southeastern Europe and, in my opinion, one can expect the consolidation of the Russian Federation, so that it will become an equal factor; an equal negotiator with both NATO and other future military organizations and alliances. [passage omitted]

[BORBA] Could you tell us something about the military industry following the breakup of the SFRY?

[Bulatovic] With the secession of the republics of the former SFRY, certain capacities of special purpose industry remained in these republics (48 percent of capacities and 46 percent of the work force). That fact has made the position of the special purpose capacities on the FRY territory considerably more difficult, particularly as some of the final producers of weapons were left outside our borders. The military-political situation made us quickly start producing some of the artillery pieces and weapons, and we attained significant success in that without calling into question the security of our borders.

Our special purpose industry shares the destiny of the Army and the overall economy of the country, which means that it is confronted with poverty, which is difficult to defeat. We can conclude, however, that we have preserved the scientific research, developmental, personnel, and production potential and, therefore, the ability to develop.

[BORBA] The SFRY used to produce everything belonging to military industry, apart from aircraft carriers and nuclear bombs. What are our military industry's plans?

[Bulatovic] Our special purpose industry is facing transformation in the sense of production, organization, and ownership. A country with such workforce and economic potentials can hardly ensure the production of as big systems as the former SFRY could. One would have to draw up a strategy of what is necessary for defense and what should be produced in domestic factories and what must be acquired on the world market. This war has also shown that relying on own forces must be our strategic orientation in equipping our army with weapons and artillery pieces.

[BORBA] Could you tell us something about the transformation of our army and the strategy of our defense?

[Bulatovic] The transformation of the army is a process that is hard to determine. The length of the realization of certain tasks depends of several factors. One is financial

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and the other is determined by the complex of foreign political circumstances. If we know what the political situation in the country and its economic position are, then it is clear why the process of transformation has slowed.

One of the tasks of the army transformation is its professionalization. The question is what percentage of its standing composition will comprise professionals. This, above all, depends on the nature of the tasks that a certain unit, a certain formation has and on how well equiped it is. One certainly cannot perform any tasks with laymen, considering the complexity of the technological systems. Our orientation is toward building a smaller but modernized and efficient army.

In order to perform a full transformation, great financial means are needed. Thus, for instance, there are now state-of-the-art systems for border protection that need no people. This costs a lot, but if we had it, then the level of military potential deployed would be far lower. This is the case with many other professions, but it needs great financial resources and time.

Where doctrin and the policy of defense are involved, I can point out that—with the new state and new Constitution—the former socialized defense concept (All-People's Defense and Social Self-Protection) has been replaced with the state-owned one. Our defense is not in the hands of some political factors, but in the power of state bodies. There are the problems of habits—ways of thinking and planning and ways of restructuring—that again slow down the implementation of the concept to the end, in the sense of its full and real affirmation. Our doctrinal orientation toward building peace requires us to always have a strong and modernly armed, efficient, and motivated military force, capable of protecting this peace with sufficient force to deter a possible aggressor.

[Box, p 10]

On Albania and Prevlaka

[BORBA] The border with Albania has been problematic ever since 1980.

[Bulatovic] It is an old rule that fear protects borders. While Albania was closed off, both toward our country and the world, the question of security of the border between Albania and Yugoslavia was a question between our two countries. Albania used to protect its border well, and I can say that there were no incidents. Albania's opening toward the West in recent times, the arrival of U.S. troops on Albanian territory, and its readiness to offer bases to NATO and other countries outside the alliance speak of a new orientation of the Albanian authorities toward the world. In the past year, Albania held as many as eight joint exercises with the U.S. Army. This fact illustrates the Albania's new course. As Albania is our neighbor, it is clear that we have to protect that border, respecting the realities in the political relations with Albania.

[BORBA] What about Prevlaka?

[Bulatovic] The Croatian Army is stationed near Prevlaka, on their own territory, where they have erected certain fortifications facing Prevlaka and thereby have failed to respect the full demilitarization of the zone. However, UN observers are still deployed on Prevlaka. In our opinion, the border issue with Croatia must be solved in a political way and by political means.

[Box, p 11]

Either in the Army or in Court

[BORBA] What is done with the Kosovo Albanians who fail to respond to the military call up?

[Bulatovic] There is a relatively large number of cases filed in the courts for the evasion of the draft and the call to military exercises. The usual court procedure is followed.

[Box, p 11]

The Only One

The Law on the Army introduced that one can also serve military service without weapons. A recruit who, for religious or other conscientious reasons, does not want to do military service under arms or wants civilian service can do so, but the service lasts 24 months, twice the regular duration.

I remember that political problems were raised in the earlier Yugoslavia around these religious reasons and conscientious objections, but the real situation is different as only a few cases of requests for non-military service have been registered in the last three years.

Serbia

Deputy Says Kosovo Cannot Secede From Yugoslavia

LD0811152195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1311 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Nov. 8 (TANJUG)—There is no obstacle to constituting a provincial parliament in Serbia's southern Kosovo and Metohija Province, which is a part of Serbia, said Zivorad Igic, a deputy in the Yugoslav Parliament.

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Speaking on the Albanian-language Aktuelnosti program of Pristina Radio, Igic, a member of the board for defense and security of the federal parliament's Chamber of Citizens, said that the majority of ethnic Albanians have previously boycotted the elections, and thus the state of Serbia, and voiced separatist demands calling for a separate republic of Kosovo.

A strong ethnic-Albanian separatist movement has for decades been active in Kosovo and Metohija. The separatist leaders have illegally declared the province a republic and urge its secession from Serbia and unification with neighboring Albania.

Igic said that it is a fact that national minorities are not a characteristic of Serbia and that many states have national minorities, but in none of them is there any mention creating a state within a state, nor of secession.

Igic said that even small Slovakia has 600,000 Hungarians, in Bulgaria there are several hundreds Turks, in neighboring Romania about two million Hungarians, but nowhere is there any mention of secession.

Igic said Albania is populated by Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims and the Gorani, and by about 400,000 Greeks, but no one is even thinking about separatism.

If the world were to apply the formula of the Albanian separatists from Kosovo-Metohija, it would shortly disintegrate into several hundred new states and ministates, which would create a general chaos: territorial, ethnic, political and economic.

DS President Calls For Negotiations With Rugova

AU0811180695 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Nov 95 p 2

[BETA report: "Djindjic: One Should Negotiate With Rugova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina—Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party (DS), stated yesterday that Ibrahim Rugova is currently the representative of the majority of the politically organized Albanians and that one should negotiate with him.

In an interview for the Albanian language weekly KOHA, Djindjic said that if negotiations need to be held with someone relevant, then this should be Ibrahim Rugova.

According to Djindjic, in the past, Milosevic held talks with Adil Zulfikarpasic instead of Alija Izetbegovic, trying to promote him as the representative of the Muslim people in Bosnia, which turned out to be a mistake. "In the case of Kosovo, one should also take reality into consideration. It would be a great mistake to invent an Albanian who does not have the support of the people," Djindjic said.

Commenting on the rumors about an "internal meeting" of the main opposition parties in Serbia with Milosevic prior to his departure for Ohio, Djindjic said that the DS was neither invited nor took part in any talks on the tackling of the Kosovo issue in Ohio.

Report Describes Background to TV Head's Ouster

AU0811200395 London WARREPORT in English Oct 95 p 22

[Report by NASA BORBA Correspondent Gordana Susa in Belgrade for the Alternative Information Network: "Heads Roll at Serbian TV; The Head of State Television Could Not Adjust to Milosevic's Peacenik Image"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "When Vucelic is removed, dirt will flow down Takovska Street [headquarters of TV Serbia] [preceding brackets as published] for months," a former director of the state-owned Serbian Radio-Television (RTS) prophesied a year and a half ago. He was referring to Milorad Vucelic, the head of the station, who was by that time already known as an honorary minister for information of the two trans-Drina Serbian governments. Now Vucelic is gone, and the prophesy appears to be coming true.

The first attacks on Vucelic appeared in some state-controlled newspapers at about that time, just as the split between the "soft" and "hard" wings of the ruling party appeared. At first, right after the mind-boggling turn of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) towards peacemaking, Vucelic did not get the message right. So the news of Milosevic's peace efforts was for a while only shown towards the end of the TV news programmes. For this diversion from the current party line, someone had to pay, so Vucelic's TV editors were the first to be put on the firing line.

It seemed for a time that Vucelic had successfully passed the buck, and had even strengthened his position. He was seen more often than usual in the company of Slobodan Milosevic. He travelled with the president to attend important meetings in Geneva and Athens and even secured a famous exclusive interview from the man, who is extremely shy of such engagements. Then the first news about the activities of the Yugoslav United Left (YUL) began to appear on television. The YUL, which split from the SPS, is lead by Mira Markovic, wife of the president, who at the time enjoyed his support. Vucelic was at such a high point in his career, being in the top ranks of the ruling party and at the same time controlling the government's most powerful

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weapon, the state TV network, that he was seen as possibly even more powerful than Milosevic himself.

But then his fortunes started to change. The first real sign of his impending fall from grace was the nomination of Dragan Milovanovic to the post of editor in chief of all informative programmes in the monolithic system of the RTS. Although Vucelic respected the coalition agreement between SPS and YUL by allocating the appropriate amount of airtime to Markovic, he could not restrain himself from criticizing her politics both privately and in some public engagements. It is believed by some that this is what eventually cost him his position. It was the first lady of Serbia herself who ordered his dismissal.

According to other sources, Vucelic was dismissed because of financial mismanagement and embezzlement of millions of dollars in voluntary contributions collected from Serbs in the diaspora. The money, which was being collected to pay for a satellite channel that would "spread the truth about Serbia," was allegedly paid into his wife's private offshore account to evade the sanctions on Serbia. The Serb channel however recently disappeared, as the funds dried up and its viewers were shocked to see Croatian TV on the same satellite frequency. It is difficult to tell just now how true these rumours are, but the real story is certain to come out sometime.

Even if they are true, however, Vucelic would not have been able to do such things without the knowledge of the government, which has now disposed of him in its usual manner. The same, of course, is true for his news coverage. The obedient TV journalists he employed at the height of war fever and jingoism brought him wide favour with the regime and much reward. Now the winds had changed, and Vucelic seemed unable to take up the new line of Milosevic the peacemaker fast enough. The latest rumours suggest that he will not be alone and that some 20 editors and five times as many journalists will be sent to follow in Vucelic's wake.

NASA BORBA Appoints Members of Council

AU0811185295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Nov 95 p 16

[Unattributed report: "Members of NASA BORBA Council Named"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session yesterday, the managing board of the NASA BORBA's publisher Fininvest named the members of NASA BORBA's Council:

Latinka Perovic, historian (head of the Council)

Tibor Varadi, professor at Central European University in Budapest

Veselin Vukotic, professor at the School of Economics in Podgorica

Vladimir Goati, sociologist

Jurij Gustincic, journalist

Mirjana Miocinovic, professor at the Theater College

Orhan Nevzati, lawyer.

The first working session of NASA BORBA's Council will be held this month.

Impact of Heating Oil Shortage on Electricity Use

AU0811205595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Nov 95

[Report by Marinela Raznjatovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The consumption of electricity remains high. One of the reason for this is the shortage of natural gas in central heating plants. For this reason apartments are being heated for only a few hours a day. Marinela Raznjatovic reports;

[Raznjatovic] Daily consumption of electricity is exceeding 110 million kWh. This is 20 percent more that in the past few days when there was no snow. Consumption in Belgrade alone is 30 percent higher. To be more precise, it stands at 25,300,000 kWh. Demand for electricity is increasing all the time, not only because of low temperatures, but also because there is no natural gas, and the central heating plants are heating apartments only a few hours a day, as has been the case in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Pristina, and Nis. When plants are heating these apartments, they are not doing it very well either.

Despite the efforts of those responsible, it is not known at present when natural gas will arrive. This is worrying the representatives of the Electricity Board of Serbia as the water from accumulation lakes is being used twice as fast as was planned for this period.

Hydro plants yesterday produced 19 million kWh instead of the planned 9.5 million. One should not forget that this is only the beginning of the heating season. Water in accumulation lakes is in fact planned for the coldest days, which are expected in December and January.

There are some other problems. Owing to the shortage of heating oil and crude oil [mazut], the Electricity Board of Serbia cannot use the generators in the Kosovo and Drmno thermoelectric power plants of some 250 megawatts. The Electricity Board of Serbia therefore

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appeals to the citizens to save electricity whenever they can and as much as they can.

Montenegro

Leadership Shies Away From Greater Serbia

AU0811195195 London WARREPORT in English Oct 95 pp 19-20

[Report by VREME correspondent Velizar Brajovic in Podgorica: "The Podgorica Leadership Turns Its Back on Belgrade"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The collapse of the Serb nationalist dream of Greater Serbia within Bosnia has prompted Belgrade to act quickly in order to prevent Montenegro from slipping out of the federation. Even Montenegrins formerly loyal to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic now seem to be more inclined to oppose his policies. For example, recent comments by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic have caused a stir within the Belgrade- Podgorica federation, highlighting the question of whether Montenegro will remain within federation after all. In an interview in the Belgrade weekly NIN, Djukanovic declared, "When we decided to enter in a federation with Serbia, we were determined that we would remain within this federation so long as it is based on democracy and equal status between the two republics. In the case that any of those basic principles is undermined in some way, we have also left space for a change of heart."

The people of Montenegro voted to join the new Yugoslav federation with Serbia in a referendum in 1992. The vote as held under the watchful eye of Belgrade and its media at a time when Serb nationalists were destroying towns and villages of the former Yugoslavia with impunity. As Djukanovic's comments reflect, Montenegrins voted for their republic as "a sovereign and equal state" within the Yugoslav federation.

Yet there is an abundance of examples which point to the fact that within the new federation some are more equal than others. Indeed, Belgrade's control over Podgorica has been getting tighter and tighter. The federal state never really started functioning, and its organs do not have executive powers. Internal life of the federal units is not regulated by the Constitution, but is subject to the whims of Milosevic. The Serbian president is widely seen as having manipulated Montenegrin politicians during the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution of the late 1980s to support his rise to power. The Yugoslav Army has also carefully ensured the participation of Montenegrin conscripts in its campaigns, most notably during the shelling of the Croatian port city of Dubrovnik and involvement in the war in Bosnia, bringing international condemnation on Montenegro.

Even at the height of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, Serbia kept Montenegro under a form of internal economic blockade, so that the common market never started functioning after the breakup of the old Yugoslavia. During the media campaign leading up to the 199? [as published] referendum on federation, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic claimed that the republic would never be able to survive econimcally, or to defend itself militarily, without Serbia.

Now they seem to have reversed their story. Djukanovic proudly announced earlier this year that, "in spite of the deeply inhumane economic sanctions," Montenegro had, for the first time in its history, become financially self-sufficient. "More money was paid into than taken from federal funds last year," added Djukanovic stressing this fact as an important factor for political equality of the two federal units. President Bulatovic, who was once seen in enthusiastic visits to Montenegrin military units fighting on the Dubrovnik frontlines, recently said that the Montenegrin government was always in favour of peace and that war would never have broken out had the true voice of Montenegro been heeded.

After recent Serb losses in Krajina and northwestern Bosnia, the myth of Serbia as protector has finally exploded. Some Montenegrins have now started reminding themselves that Serbs had never fought for Montenegro in the past, while the converse has been true more than once. Montenegrins, who are stereotypically portrayed as exceptionally bellicose people, showed their discontent during a recent military recruitment drive, when less than 6 per cent of called conscripts reported to their barracks. "I will only fight on my doorstep. I would not go to defend even my own mother if it means fighting outside Montenegro," commented one of the conscientious objectors. Attempts to eradicate Montenegrin identity are now definitively doomed. Amfilohije Radovic, the war-mongering metropolitan bishop of the Serb Orthodox Church in Montenegro, is now so discredited that few people still wish to communicate with him. The Montenegrin police is currently "cleansing" men exceptionally loyal to Belgrade, a process so comprehensive that it has even included the removal of the Minister of Interior, Nikola Pejanovic, last June. Next in line are cultural and educational institutions, which are largely headed by cadres loyal to Serb authorities. The army, which at 50,000 troops is too big for Montenegro's needs, is still largely controlled by Serb officers. However, it is now enjoying far less support from Montenegrin pro-Serb nationalists, as the problems in conscripting new soldiers shows.

In the shadow of enormous internal changes, Montenegrin officials this year took greater courage than ever

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to express their discontent with the federal government. One of the grievances was related to an accusation for embezzlement of several million Deutschmarks worth of federal import duties which were allegedly misappropriated by Minister Mihail Kertes. At the same time, the federal state for several months did not pay out state pensions to Montenegrin pensioners. The solution for both problems is a sign of the new wind that blows within the Montenegrin government: money coming in from import duties are now redirected from federal funds into Montenegrin pension funds.

The economic war between the two federal units does not end there. During the tourist season last summer, Serbia led a propaganda campaign to lure tourists from Montenegro to summer resorts in Greece and elsewhere. This included relaxing rules on the transfer of hard currency, and other measures. Managing to survive, Montenegro thus provoked heavy accusations from Serbia that it had pursued illegal means to gain other income. Mirjana Markovic, leader of the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) and wife of President Milosevic, recently accused Prime Minister Djukanovic of having taken part in smuggling operations. She promised that when her party wins power, he would be jailed for black-market dealing.

Ljubisa Ristic, a renowned theatre director who is also a member of JUL, was more to the point: "The parting of ways between Serbia and Montenegro," he said, "would be disastrous." JUL, which advocates greater centralisation of the Yugoslav federation, is campaigning to change the constitution to abrogate Montenegro's status as a separate federal unit. Even POBJEDA daily, the Montenegrin government mouthpiece, recently published a series of articles on the federation which argued that Serbia must harmonise its constitution with the federal one. The jurisdiction of the Serbian constitution overlaps too often with that of the federal state, which provides the necessary juridical backing for control over Montenegro. Prime Minister Djukanovic has recently asserted that the federal constitution cannot be altered without Podgorica's involvement.

Some Belgrade opposition as well as official sources have, however, recently confirmed that a new version of a federal constitution has been drafted. The draft, which eradicates Montenegrin statehood, proposes the division of the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into seven regions of which Montenegro would be one. Milosevic, who according to the present constitution cannot be nominated for president after the end of his present mandate, would be the head of that new state. According to the same source, Montenegro has been under pressure since last spring to accept the draft. It is not clear whether the economic war against Montenegro was a part of that pressure.

With the apparent volte-face of the leadership over Belgrade, ordinary Montenegrins wonder just how much the politicians are fighting for Montenegro, or for their own political power. The war-mongering policy has obviously not helped Montenegro, and a change of policy is hardly surprising. Clearly, the future of Montenegro can only be decided by a referendum. The political climate which brought Montenegro into an alliance with Serbia four years ago has now completely changed. However, it is still too early to speculate whether Montenegro will go its own way or remain within the federation. All eyes are now turned to the coming peace conference on former Yugoslavia.

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